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Abstract
In this thesis, we are concerned with the safety and security of programs. The problems ad-
dressed here are the correctness of SiJa (a subset of Java) source code and Java bytecode, and
the information flow security of SiJa programs. A lot of research has been made on these top-
ics, but almost all of them study each topic independently and no approach can handle all of
these aspects. We propose a uniform framework that integrates the effort of proving correctness
and security into one process. The core concept for this uniform approach is sound program
transformation based on symbolic execution and deduction. The correctness of SiJa source code
is verified with KeY, a symbolic execution based approach. Partial evaluation actions are in-
terleaved during symbolic execution to reduce the proof size. By synthesizing the symbolic
execution tree achieved in the source code verification phase, we can generate a program that
is bisimilar to, but also more optimized than, the original one with respect to a set of observ-
able locations. The soundness of program transformation is proven. Apply the sound program
transformation approach, we can generate a program bisimilar to the original program with
respect to the low security level variables. This results in a more precise analysis of information
flow security than the approaches based on security type systems. We can also generate Java
bytecode from SiJa source code program transformation approach, where the the correctness of
the Java bytecode is guaranteed and compiler verification is not necessary.
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1 Introduction
When we had no computers, we had no programming problem either. When we had
a few computers, we had a mild programming problem. Confronted with machines a
million times as powerful, we are faced with a gigantic programming problem.
— Edsger W. Dijkstra [Dij86]
1.1 Overview: Software Correctness and Security
Along with the development of information technology, computers play an important role in
the modern society. Not only are they used everywhere, especially for handling complicated
tasks, but the computer itself is getting more and more complex in both hardware and software
aspects. Though it is difficult to make the hardware part working flawlessly, it is even more
challenging to ensure the correctness of the software part. Sometimes, the software failures can
result in a disaster, such as the infamous explosion of Ariane 5 [Boa06]. There are more than
100 “software horror stories” listed in this website document [Der], to show the consequence of
software bugs. Therefore, ensuring the correctness of software is extremely important, no matter
of its difficulties.
What is the meaning of “correctness”? The correctness of software is asserted when it is
correct with respect to the specification that describes the intended behavior of the software.
Specification can be informal, in which case it can be considered as a blueprint or user manual
from a developer’s point of view. Formal specification, that models the software behavior in a
mathematically rigorous way, will contribute to achieving a more reliable software system.
Assertions can be considered as a lightweight formal specification. When a program reaches
a particular execution point, the assertions, normally written in Boolean expressions or for-
mulas, should always be satisfied. An extension of the assertion mechanism is design by con-
tract [Mey86, Mey92], which uses preconditions, postconditions and invariants to specify the
classes of the object-oriented programs. The Eiffel programming language [Mey00] features
built-in support for design-by-contract specifications.
It is worth to mention that writing a good formal specification is nontrivial due to the math-
ematical skills required from the programmers and the expressiveness of the specification lan-
guage that is used. Research on specification generation includes QuickSpec [CSH10] that
generates the specification automatically for sets of pure functions based on testing, and the
ABS [CDH+11] specification language that bridges the gap between a highly abstract modeling
language and an implementation-oriented specification language.
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A natural way to ensure the correctness of software is to take some inputs and execute the
program to see if the outputs are as expected with respect to the specification. This method is
known as program testing. In the testing process, a collection of test cases are used to cover
as thoroughly as possible the program execution branches to show whether errors will occur.
The chosen test cases are the key factor of testing; several quality criteria for a test suite have
been proposed to describe the degree of code coverage [Mye04]. The test cases can also be
generated automatically [EH07]. Testing is the most used method to establish high quality of
software in industry nowadays, and it will retain its importance in the future. However, certain
limitations of testing imply that it is not the only, not even the best, way to achieve bug-free
software. For many software systems, the state space is too large for exhaustive testing; while
in a concurrent setting, it is simply impossible to reproduce all feasible runs. As Dijkstra [Dij70]
famously pointed out, “Program testing can be used to show the presence of bugs, but never to
show their absence".
Another way to design reliable software is by using formal methods. It is a mathematically
rigorous technique for specification, design and verification of software systems. One kind of
formal methods is oriented on the abstract design process. The examples are the modeling
languages such as ASM [BS03], B [Abr96], Z [Spi92] and Alloy [Jac02].
Formal software verification usually concentrates on the source code level, ensuring the correct-
ness of the software implemented in a certain programming language. Both dynamic and static
techniques can be used in software verification, depending on whether to execute the program
or not. Assertions and design-by-contract specifications are often used for dynamic run-time
checks to indicate whether a test run has been successful. Static verification techniques, which
do not rely on program execution, include abstract interpretation [CC77], software model check-
ing [MCDE02, HJMS03, CKL04, BBC+06] and deductive verification [Hoa69].
Abstract interpretation relates abstract analysis to program execution by evaluating the be-
havior of a program on an abstract domain to obtain an approximate solution. Software model
checking is often combined with abstraction techniques, e.g., predicate abstraction [FQ02], since
the state space of software programs is typically too large to analyze directly. In both methods,
abstraction techniques are used, but no formal logical proofs are created. Deductive verification
constructs a logical proof of the program to show its correctness. The generated proof obliga-
tions or verification conditions for the program are proved automatically, or manually with some
interactions, by theorem provers or SMT solvers. No matter which formal software verification
technique is used, the state space exploration problem is always one of the major concerns and
it is an important research topic in this area.
There are many formal software verification techniques to ensure the correctness of the source
code, despite their limitations, however, the correctness of the software system is not guaranteed
by the correct source code only, because errors can also happen e.g. due to a buggy compiler.
Another important topic is compiler verification [Dav03] that aims to ensure the correctness of
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the compiled code (bytecode), with respect to the source code. It normally requires reasoning
about actual compiler implementations and the behavior of the compiler for an infinite number
of programs and their translations, so compiler verification is very expensive and hard to scale
to realistic programming languages and sophisticated optimization.
A “grand challenge” for computer science proposed by Hoare [Hoa03] is to achieve a “ver-
ifying compiler” that checks the correctness of a program along with compilation, just like a
compiler performing type checking nowadays.
Since flow of information plays a growing role in society, the preservation of confidentiality
becomes an important concern. Confidentiality of programs is an issue of software security.
Information-flow control [Den82] tracks the flow of information in programs to ensure that no
information leak occurs. Language-based information flow security [SM03] applies language-
based techniques to analyze the program, in an automated manner, to enforce that the program
satisfies a security policy of interest.
In information-flow control, a security policy is accompanied by a permissive enforcement
mechanism, proven sound with respect to a security policy. When run on a program, if the
enforcement reports a positive result, then the soundness proof implies that the program satisfies
the policy. There are several ways to achieve this. Static analysis approaches take the form
of a security type system [VIS96, HS06], by tracking the confidentiality level of information
contained in variables and program context, (over-)approximates information flows occurring
in (an over-approximation of) the control flow paths the program can take. Dynamic analysis
approaches are usually security monitors [Vol99, AS09], which monitor the propagation of the
input data that is labeled with the confidentiality level at run time. Static analysis approaches
have the advantage of no runtime overhead; while dynamic analysis approaches need to access
to the current control flow path so that highly dynamic language constructs can be treated in a
permissive manner.
1.2 Problems and Contributions
Traditionally, source code correctness, bytecode correctness and source code security are ana-
lyzed independently with different approaches and tools, as illustrated in Figure 1.1.
In this thesis, we try to integrate all these 3 aspects into a uniform framework, so that it is
possible to ensure software correctness and security within one process. We studied SiJa as the
programming language in this thesis. It is a subset of Java with certain restrictions.
The core concept is a sound approach of program transformation. A program transformation
is an operation that takes a program and generates another program. The transformed pro-
gram is required to be semantically equivalent to the original one. Our program transformation
approach is realized based on symbolic execution and deduction, and it contains two phases.
The first phase is symbolic execution [Kin76] of the source code performed by KeY [BHS06],
3
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Figure 1.1: Software correctness and security: traditional approaches.
a state-of-the-art verification tool for Java programs. The symbolic execution is carried out by
the application of sequent calculus rules, and the integrated first order deduction engine in KeY
helps to achieve a precise analysis of variable dependencies, aliasing, and elimination of unfea-
sible paths. In the second phase, we extend the sequent calculus rules with suitable ingredients,
e.g. observable locations, such that the rules can be applied reversely and the target program
is generated in a step-wise manner. The soundness of our program transformation process is
proved.
The result of the program transformation is a program that has the same behavior as (or is
bisimilar to) the original program with respect to the observable locations. The soundness of the
program transformation process guarantees the soundness of the generated program. It enjoys
the following properties:
• The generated program is optimized over the original program for the sake of the first order
logic reasoning and possible simple partial evaluation steps performed during symbolic
execution.
• We can generate a program that is bisimilar to the original one with respect to certain
observable locations, e.g., low sensitive variables. This helps to achieve an information
flow analysis.
• We can generate bytecode form source code, so that if the source code is verified correctly,
the bytecode is also correct without further verification. This is a deductive compilation
approach.
Figure 1.2 gives an overview of the contributions of this thesis. To summarize:
• We interleave symbolic execution and partial evaluation to reduce the proof state space
and speed up the proving process.
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Figure 1.2: Software correctness and security: a uniform framework.
• We propose a sound approach of program transformation that ensures the correctness of
the generated code with respect to the source code.
• We propose further optimization techniques for program transformation.
• We implement a partial evaluator for SiJa.
• We apply program transformation to information flow analysis.
• We apply program transformation to deductive compilation.
The following chapters are organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 gives the background of KeY and symbolic execution;
• Chapter 3 introduces partial evaluation and shows its interleaving with symbolic execution
for speeding correctness proofs;
• Chapter 4 concentrates on the main approach of program transformation and its soundness
proof;
• Chapter 5 shows the application of the program transformation to information flow;
• Chapter 6 gives an introduction of applying program transformation technique to bytecode
compilation;
• Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and points out some further research directions.
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1.3 Publications
Here is a list of publications related to this thesis work:
• Interleaving Symbolic Execution and Partial Evaluation. Richard Bubel and Reiner Hähnle
and Ran Ji. 8th International Symposium on Formal Methods for Components and Objects
(FMCO). Eindhoven, the Netherlands. 2009. [BHJ09]
It is concerned with the source code level verification for sequential Java programs. In this
paper, we show that symbolic execution and partial evaluation not only are compatible
with each other, but that there is considerable potential for synergies. Specifically, we
integrate a simple partial evaluator for a Java-like language into the logic-based symbolic
execution engine of the software verification tool KeY [BHS06]. This allows to interleave
symbolic execution and partial evaluation steps within a uniform (logic-based) framework
in a sound way. Intermittent partial evaluation during symbolic execution has the effect
that the remaining program that is yet to be executed is continuously simplified relative
to the current path conditions and the current symbolic state in each symbolic execution
trace.
I carried out the experiments and was involved in the paper writing.
• Program Specialization Via a Software Verification Tool. Richard Bubel and Reiner Hähnle
and Ran Ji. 9th International Symposium on Formal Methods for Components and Objects
(FMCO). Graz, Austria. 2010. [BHJ10]
We propose a new approach to specialize Java-like programs via the software verifica-
tion tool KeY, in which a symbolic execution engine is used. It is a two-phase procedure
that first symbolically executes the program interleaved with a simple partial evaluator,
and then synthesizes the specialized program in the second phase. The soundness of the
approach is guaranteed by a bisimulation relation on the source and specialized programs.
I designed the main theory and was involved in the paper writing.
• PE-KeY: A Partial Evaluator for Java Programs. Ran Ji and Richard Bubel. 9th International
Conference on Integrated Formal Methods (iFM). Pisa, Italy. 2012. [JB12]
In this paper we present a prototypical implementation of a partial evaluator for Java
programs, named PE-KeY, based on the verification system KeY. We argue that using
a program verifier as technological basis provides potential benefits leading to a higher
degree of specialization. We discuss in particular how loop invariants and preconditions
can be exploited to specialize programs. First experimental results are provided.
I did the main implementation and was involved in the paper writing.
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• Program Transformation Based on Symbolic Execution and Deduction. Ran Ji and Reiner
Hähnle and Richard Bubel. 11th International Conference on Software Engineering and For-
mal Methods (SEFM). Madrid, Spain. 2013. [JHB13]
In this paper, we present a program transformation framework based on symbolic execu-
tion and deduction. Its virtues are: (i) behavior preservation of the transformed program
is guaranteed by a sound program logic, and (ii) automated first-order solvers are used
for simplification and optimization. Transformation consists of two phases: first the source
program is symbolically executed by sequent calculus rules in a program logic. This in-
volves a precise analysis of variable dependencies, aliasing, and elimination of unfeasible
execution paths. In the second phase, the target program is synthesized by a leave-to-root
traversal of the symbolic execution tree by backward application of (extended) sequent
calculus rules. We prove soundness by a suitable notion of bisimulation and we discuss
one possible approach to automated program optimization.
I developed the main theory and was involved in the paper writing.
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2 Background
2.1 KeY and Symbolic Execution
KeY [BHS06] is a deductive verification system for programs written in the Java language, or
more precisely Java Card language [Mos05] that is roughly a subset of sequential Java with some
smart card extensions. The Java Modeling Language (JML) [LBR03] is used as its specification
language. On proving a program, KeY first translates the specifications into proof obligations,
which are logic formulas whose logical validity corresponds to the correctness of the program
with respect to the specification. The logic used is dynamic logic [Pra76, HKT00b], an extension
of first-order predicate logic with modal operators that contain executable program fragments
of some programming language. More specifically, KeY uses Java Dynamic Logic (JavaDL) in
which the program fragments are written in Java. Based on the proof obligations, KeY acts as a
theorem prover to perform deductive verification. A novel feature of JavaDL compared to other
variants of dynamic logic is the use of state updates [Bec01, Rüm06], which capture the state
changes during the program execution. The program is executed in a symbolic way such that
the symbolic values of the program variables are used instead of the concrete ones. When the
symbolic execution ends, the programs are removed completely from the JavaDL formulas and
therefore the verification goal is reduced to prove the validity of first-order formulas with the
help of some built-in theories. The proofs are usually performed by KeY itself, or handled by
external satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solvers such as Simplify [DNS05] or Z3 [dMB08].
In fact, KeY is not only a Java verifier, it also supports other useful features such as test case
generation [EH07] and symbolic visual debugging [HBBR10] in its variants. The most recent
version of KeY supports explicit memory heap reasoning [Wei11].
Tools for deductive verification of object-oriented programs that are similar to KeY include
KIV [HHRS86, Ste04], Jive [MPH00] and VeriFast [JP08]. KIV uses a dynamic logic like KeY
and performs verification within one prover. Jive uses a Hoare logic and employs a generic
theorem prover, Isabelle/HOL [NPW02], or an SMT solver for proving program-independent
properties. VeriFast works with separation logic [Rey02] and emphasizes on fast verification of
C and Java.
While SMT solvers can be used in KeY as a trusted “black box” to gain possibly better au-
tomation and performance by sacrificing some traceability, they are treated as the primary
foundation for several other tools. These include ESC/Java [FLL+02], ESC/Java2 [CK05],
Spec# [BLS05, BFL+11] and Frama-C [CKK+12]. The common paradigm of them is verifica-
tion condition generation, in which the program and its specification are translated into first-
order formulas named verification conditions that are passed to an SMT solver. In practice, the
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source code is often compiled to an intermediate language before generating the verification
condition. This allows the modularization of the verification system, however, as discussed ear-
lier, the compilation itself is a non-deductive step, thus also needs to be verified. For instance,
Boogie [BCD+05] is a tool used to generate verification conditions from the intermediate lan-
guage for Spec#. Some other Java verifiers based on verification condition generation also use
theorem provers for higher-order logic, in addition to SMT solvers, to prove the verification con-
ditions, e.g., JACK [BRL03] and Krakatoa/Why [FM07]. The verification condition generation
is usually not a deductive, rule-based process.
The mechanism used in KeY that corresponds to verification condition generation is sym-
bolic execution. Dating back to its introduction in the 1970s [Kin76, Bur74, BEL75], symbolic
execution has only recently been realized efficiently for industrially relevant programming lan-
guages. It is a central, very versatile program analysis technique that is used for formal program
verification [BHS06, HRS87, PV04], extended static checking and verification [BLS05], debug-
ging [Bau07], and automatic test case generation [dHT08, EH07]. In the last decade a number
of efficient symbolic execution engines for real heap-based programming and intermediate lan-
guages were created including, besides KeY (for Java, C, ABS, see [BHS06]), KIV (for Java, see
[Ste04]), Bogor/Kiasan (for BIR, see [DLR06]), Pex (for MSIL, see [dHT08]), VeriFast (for C,
Java, see [JP08]) and COSTA/PET (for Java bytecode, see [AAG+07, AGZP10]).
The main idea of symbolic execution is to use symbolic values, instead of actual data, as input,
and to represent the values of program variables as symbolic expressions. The output values
computed by a program are expressed as a function of the input symbolic values.
The state of a symbolically executed program includes the (symbolic) values of program vari-
ables, a path condition and a program counter. The path condition is a (quantifier-free) boolean
formula over the symbolic inputs which accumulates constraints that the inputs must satisfy
in order for an execution to follow the particular path. The program counter defines the next
statement to be executed. A symbolic execution tree, in which the nodes represent the program
states, characterizes the execution paths followed during the symbolic execution of a program.
Symbolic execution in KeY is performed based on the sequent calculus rules for JavaDL, and
therefore it is a deductive process compared to verification condition generation. In general, a
sequent is an expression of the form   =)   with the antecedent  , and the succedent   being
sets of formulas. A sequent has the same meaning as the formula
V
 2  !
W
 2  .
Sequent rules have the general form
name
s1 · · · sn
s
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where s, s1, . . . , sn are sequents. The sequents above the line are the rule’s premises while
sequent s is called the rule’s conclusion. A sequent proof is a tree whose nodes are labeled
with sequents and with a sequent whose validity is to be proven at its root. This proof tree is
constructed by applying sequent rules r to leaf nodes n whose sequent matches the conclusion
r. The premises of r are then added as children of n. A branch of a proof tree is closed if and
only if it contains an application of an axiom. A proof tree is closed if and only if all its branches
are closed.
Accordingly, sequent rules for JavaDL work on a first active statement s and a current update
U in the following general form of a conclusion:
 =)U [⇡ s; !] , 
Path conditions are represented by suitable formulas and accumulate in the antecedent  ,
and ! is the remaining program. In addition, ⇡ stands for an inactive prefix containing labels,
opening braces or method-frames. In this thesis, we do not write down ⇡ explicitly, but keep in
mind this possible inactive prefix.
An example of symbolic execution is shown in the following program fragment that orders
the values of x and y. After its execution, x is the maximum of x0, y0 and y their minimum.
int x = x0;
int y = y0;
if (x > y) {
int t = x;
x = y;
y = t;
}
State update captures the state changes during program execution. We use location-value pairs
to represent states in symbolic execution. The expression {l1 := t1 || · · · ||ln := tn} denotes a
symbolic state in which each program location of the form li has the expression ti as its symbolic
value. After symbolic execution of the first three statements of the program above we obtain
the symbolic state U = {x := x0 ||y := y0}. Symbolic execution of the conditional splits the
execution into two branches, because the value x0 > y0 of the guard expression is symbolic and
cannot be reduced immediately. The value of the guard becomes a path condition relative to
which symbolic execution continues. Under the path condition P1 ⌘ x0 > y0 the body of the
conditional is executed which results in the final symbolic state U 0 = {x := y0 ||y := x0 ||t :=
x0}. The other branch terminates immediately in state U under path condition P2 ⌘ x0  y0.
Symbolic execution as realized in KeY makes sure that every possible branch of the execution
is considered. With the help of the built-in reasoning system, e.g. preconditions, path condi-
tions, invariants, some unfeasible paths can be eliminated and the branches to be proved are
reduced. The work flow of KeY can be summarized in Figure. 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Work flow of KeY.
2.2 Programming Language
In this thesis, we use SiJa as the programming language. The object-oriented programming
language SiJa is a simplified Java variant and closely related to the language defined in [BP06].
The differences to Java can be summarized as follows:
• Unsupported Features. Multi-threading, graphics, dynamic class loading, generic types or
floating point datatypes are not supported by SiJa. Formal specification and verification of
these features is a topic of ongoing research, therefore, left out completely.
• Restricted Features. For ease of presentation SiJa imposes some additional restrictions com-
pared to Java. The KeY tool and the prototype implementation of our ideas evaluated
in Chapter 3 do not impose these restrictions, but model and respect the Java semantics
faithfully. The following restrictions apply to SiJa:
Inheritance and Polymorphism. For the sake of a simple semantics for dynamic dispatch of
method invocations SiJa abstains from Java-like interfaces and method overloading.
Likewise, with exception of the Null type, the type hierarchy induced by user-defined
class types has a tree structure with class Object as root.
Prohibiting method overloading allows to identify a method within a class unambigu-
ously by its name and number of parameters. We allow polymorphism (i.e. methods
can be overwritten in subclasses) but require that their signature must be exactly the
same, otherwise it is a compile-time error.
Visibility. All classes, methods and fields are publicly visible. This restriction contributes
also to a simpler dynamic dispatch semantics.
No Exceptions. SiJa has no support for exceptions. Instead of runtime exceptions like
NullPointerExceptions the program will simply not terminate in these cases.
No class/object Initialization. In Java the first active usage of a type or creation of a new
instance triggers complex initialization. SiJa supports only instance creation, but does
not initialize fields upon creation. In particular, SiJa does not support static or instance
initializers. User defined constructors are also missing in SiJa, a new instance is simply
created by the expression new T ().
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Primitive Types. Only boolean and int are available. To keep the semantics of standard
arithmetic operators simple, int is an unlimited datatype representing the whole
numbers Z rather than a finite datatype with overflow.
A SiJa program p is a non-empty set of class declarations with at least one class
of name Object. The class hierarchy is a tree with class Object as root. A class
Cl := (cname, scnameopt,fld,mtd) consists of (i) a classname cname unique in p, (ii) the name
of its superclass scname (only omitted for cname = Object), and (iii) a list of field fld and
method mtd declarations.
The syntax for class declaration is the same as in Java. The only lacking features are construc-
tors and static/instance initialization blocks. SiJa knows also the special reference type Null
which is a singleton with null as the only element. It may be used in place of any reference
type and is the only type that is a subtype of all class types.
To keep examples short we agree on the following convention: if not explicitly stated other-
wise, any given sequence of statements is seen as if it would be the body of a static, void method
declared in a class Default with no fields declared.
Dynamic dispatch works in SiJa as follows: we need to determine the implementation of
a method on encountering a method invocation such as o.m(a). To do so, first look up the
dynamic type T of the object referenced by o. Then scan all classes between T and the static
type of o for an implementation of a method named m and the correct number of parameters.
The first match is taken.
The syntax of the executable fragment of SiJa is given in Figure 2.2.
Statements
stmnt ::= stmnt stmnt | lvarDecl | locExp’=’exp’;’ | cond | loop
loop ::= while ’(’exp’)’ ’{’stmnt’}’
lvarDecl ::=Type IDENT ( ’=’ exp)opt’;’
cond ::= if ’(’exp’)’ ’{’stmnt’}’ else ’{’stmnt’}’
Expressions
exp ::= (exp.)optmthdCall | opExp | locExp
mthdCall::= mthdName’(’expopt(’,’exp)⇤’)’
opExp ::= opr(expopt(,exp)⇤) | Z | TRUE | FALSE | null
opr ::= ! | - | < | <= | >= | > | == | && | || | + | - | * | / | % | ++
Locations
locExp ::= IDENT | exp.IDENT
Figure 2.2: Syntax of SiJa.
Figure 2.3 shows an example of SiJa program. It can be used in an online shopping session.
If the customer buys at least 3 items and has a coupon, a 10% discount for all but the first two
items will be granted.
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public class OnLineShopping {
boolean cpn;
public int read() { /* read price of item */ }
public int sum(int n) {
int i = 1;
int count = n;
int tot = 0;
while(i <= count) {
int m = read();
if(i >=3 && cpn) {
tot = tot + m * 9 / 10;
i++; }
else {
tot = tot + m;
i++; }
}
return tot;
}
}
Figure 2.3: A SiJa program fragment.
Any complex statement can be easily decomposed into a sequence of simpler statements with-
out changing the meaning of a program, e.g., y = z ++; can be decomposed into int t = z;
z = z + 1; y = t;, where t is a fresh variable, not used anywhere else. As we shall see later,
a suitable notion of simplicity is essential, for example, to compute variable dependencies and
simplify symbolic states. This is built into our semantics and calculus, so we need a precise
definition of simple statements. In Figure 2.4, statements in the syntactic category spStmnt have
at most one source of side effect each. This can be a non-terminating expression (such as a null
pointer access), a method call, or an assignment to a location.
spStmnt ::= spLvarDecl | locVar’=’spExp’;’ | locVar’=’spAtr’;’| spAtr’=’spExp’;’
spLvarDecl ::=Type IDENT’;’
spExp ::= (locVar.)opt spMthdCall | spOpExp | litVar
spMthdCall::= mthdName’(’litVaropt(’,’litVar)⇤’)’
spOpExp ::= !litVar | -litVar | litVar binOpr litVar
litVar ::= litval | locVar litval ::=Z | TRUE | FALSE | null
binOpr ::= < | <= | >= | > | == | && | || | + | - | * | / | %
locVar ::= IDENT
spAtr ::= locVar.IDENT
Figure 2.4: Syntax of SiJa simple statements.
By decomposing every complex statement, a SiJa program p can be transformed into an equiv-
alent (on the variables of p) program containing only simple statements. The program shown
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in Figure 2.5 has the same meaning as the program in Figure 2.3, but contains only simple
statements.
public class OnLineShopping {
boolean cpn;
public int read() { /* read price of item */ }
public int sum(int n) {
int i = 1;
int count = n;
int tot = 0;
while(i <= count) {
int m;
m = read();
boolean b;
b = i >= 3;
boolean b1;
b1 = b && cpn;
if(b1) {
int t;
t = m * 9;
int t1;
t1 = t / 10;
tot = tot + t1;
i = i + 1; }
else {
tot = tot + m;
i = i + 1; }
}
return tot;
}
}
Figure 2.5: A SiJa program fragment contain only simple statements.
Because SiJa is a simple version of Java, the theories developed in this thesis are naturally
applicable for this subset of Java. The implementation is integrated and evaluated in the KeY
system.
2.3 Program Logic
Our program logic is dynamic logic (DL) [HKT00a]. The target program occurs in unencoded
form as a first-class citizen inside the logic’s connectives. Sorted first-order dynamic logic is
sorted first-order logic that is syntactically closed with respect to the program correctness
modalities [·]· (box) and h·i· (diamond). The first argument is a program and the second a
dynamic logic formula. Let p denote a program and   a dynamic logic formula then [p]  and
hpi  are DL-formulas. Informally, the former expresses that if p is executed and terminates then
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in all reached final states   holds; the latter means that if p is executed then it terminates and
in at least one of the reached final states   holds. The box modality expresses partial correctness
of a program, while the diamond modality coincides with total correctness. Hoare logic [Hoa69]
can be subsumed by dynamic logic since the Hoare triple {pre} p {post} can be expressed as the
DL formula pre! [p]post.
We consider only deterministic programs, hence, a program p executed in a given state s
either terminates and reaches exactly one final state or it does not terminate and there are no
reachable final states.
A dynamic logic based on SiJa-programs is called SiJa-DL. The signature of the program logic
depends on a context SiJa-program C .
Definition 1 (SiJa-Signature ⌃C ). A signature ⌃C = (Sort, ,Pred,Func,LVar) consists of:
(i) a set of names Sort called sorts containing at least one sort for each primitive type and one for
each class Cl declared in C : Sort◆ {int,boolean} [ {Cl | for all classes Cl declared in C };
(ii) a partial subtyping order  : Sort⇥ Sort that models the subtype hierarchy of C faithfully;
(iii) a set of predicate symbols Pred := {p : T1 ⇥ . . .⇥ Tn | Ti 2 Sort,n 2 N}. We call ↵(p) =
T1⇥ . . .⇥ Tn the signature of the predicate symbol.
(iv) a set of function symbols Func := { f : T1 ⇥ . . .⇥ Tn ! T | Ti, T 2 Sort,n 2 N}. We call
↵( f ) = T1 ⇥ . . .⇥ Tn! T the signature of the function symbol. Func := Funcr [ PV [Attr
is further divided into disjoint subsets:
– the rigid function symbols Funcr;
– the program variables PV = {i,j, . . .}, which are non-rigid constants;
– the non-rigid function symbols attribute Attr, such that for each attribute a of type T
declared in class Cl an attribute function a@Cl : Cl! T 2 Attr exists. We omit the @Cl
from attribute function names if no ambiguity arises.
(v) a set of logical variables LVar := {x : T | T 2 Sort}.
We distinguish between rigid and non-rigid function and predicate symbols. Intuitively, the
semantics of rigid symbols does not depend on the current state of program execution, while
non-rigid symbols are state-dependent. Local program variables, static, and instance fields are
modeled as non-rigid function symbols and together form a separate class of non-rigid symbols
called location symbols. Specifically, local program variables and static fields are modeled as
non-rigid constants, instance fields as unary non-rigid functions.
Example 1. In the program shown in Figure 2.3,
• int, boolean are sorts;
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• <=, && are predicate symbols;
• +, =, *, / are rigid function symbols;
• i, count, tot are program variables;
⇧⌃C denotes the set of all executable SiJa programs (i.e., sequences of statements) with loca-
tions over signature ⌃C . In this thesis, we use the notion of a program to refer to a sequence
of executable SiJa-statements. If we want to include class, interface or method declarations, we
either include them explicitly or make a reference to the context program C .
The inductive definition of terms and formulas is standard, but we introduce a new syntactic
category called update to represent state updates with symbolic expressions.
Definition 2 (Terms, Updates and Formulas). Terms t, updates u and formulas   arewell-sorted
first-order expressions of the following kind:
t ::= x | i | t.a | f (t, . . . , t) | (  ? t : t) |
Z | TRUE | FALSE | null | {u}t
u ::= i := t | t.a := t | u k u | {u}u
  ::= true | false | p(t, . . . , t) | ¬  |      (  2 {^,_,!,$}) | (  ?   :  ) |
8x : T.  | 9x : T.  | [p]  | hpi  | {u} 
where a 2 Attr, f 2 Func, p 2 Pred,i 2 PV, x : T 2 LVar, and p is a sequence of executable SiJa
statements.
An elementary update i := t or t.a := t is a pair of location and term. They are of static
single assignment (SSA) form [AWZ88, RWZ88], with the same meaning as simple assignments.
Elementary updates are composed to parallel updates u1ku2 and work like simultaneous assign-
ments. Updates applied to terms or formulas are again terms or formulas.
Terms, formulas and updates are evaluated with respect to a SiJa-DL Kripke structure.
Definition 3 (Kripke structure). A SiJa-DL Kripke structure K⌃SiJa = (D, I ,S) consists of
(i) a set of elements D called domain,
(ii) an interpretation I with
– I(T ) = DT , T 2 Sort assigning each sort its non-empty domain DT . It adheres to the
restrictions imposed by the subtype order  ; Null is always interpreted as a singleton set
and subtype of all class types;
– I( f ) : DT1⇥. . .⇥DTn !DT for each rigid function symbol f : T1⇥. . .⇥Tn! T 2 Funcr;
– I(p)✓ DT1 ⇥ . . .⇥DTn for each predicate symbol p : T1⇥ . . .⇥ Tn 2 Pred;
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(iii) a set of states S assigning meaning to non-rigid function symbols: let s 2 S then s(a@Cl) :
DCl!DT , a@Cl : Cl! T 2 Attr and s(i) : DT , i 2 PV.
The pair D = (D, I) is called a first-order structure.
As usual in first-order logic, to define evaluation of terms and formulas in addition to a struc-
ture we need the notion of a variable assignment. A variable assignment   : LVar! DT maps a
logical variable x : T to its domain DT .
Definition 4 (Evaluation function). A term, formula or update is evaluated relative to a given
first-order structure D = (D, I), a state s 2 S and a variable assignment   , while programs and ex-
pressions are evaluated relative to a D and s 2 S. The evaluation function val is defined recursively.
It evaluates
(i) every term t : T to a value valD,s, (t) 2 DT ;
(ii) every formula   to a truth value valD,s, ( ) 2 {tt, ff };
(iii) every update u to a state transformer valD,s, (u) 2 S! S;
(iv) every expression e : T to a set of pairs of state and value valD,s(e)✓ 2S⇥T ;
(v) every statement st to a set of states valD,s(st)✓ 2S.
Since SiJa is deterministic, all sets of states or state-value pairs have at most one element.
Figure 2.6 shows a collection of the semantic definition. The expression s[x v] denotes a
state coincides with s except at x which is mapped to the evaluation of v.
Example 2 (Update semantics). We illustrate the semantics of updates of Figure 2.6. Evaluating
{i := j+1}i  j in a state s is identical to evaluating the formula i  j in a state s0 which coincides
with s except for the value of i which is evaluated to the value of valD,s, (j+ 1). Evaluation of the
parallel update i := jkj := i in a state s leads to the successor state s0 identical to s except that the
values of i and j are swapped. The parallel update i := 3ki := 4 has a conflict as i is assigned
different values. In such a case the last occurring assignment i := 4 overrides all previous ones of
the same location. Evaluation of {i := j}{j := i}  in a state s results in evaluating   in a state,
where i has the value of j, and j remains unchanged.
Remark. {i := j}{j := i}  is the sequential application of updates i := j and j := i on the
formula  . To ease the presentation, we overload the concept of update and also call {i := j}{j :=
i} an update. In the following context, if not stated otherwise, we use the upper-case letter U to
denote this kind of update, compared to the real update that is denoted by a lower-case letter u. An
update U could be the of form {u} and {u1} . . . {un}. Furthermore, {u1} . . . {un} can be simplified
into the form of {u}, namely the normal form (NF) of update.
18
For terms:
valD,s, (TRUE) = True
valD,s, (FALSE) = False, where {True,False}= D(boolean)
valD,s, (x) =  (x), x 2 LVar
valD,s, (x) = s(x), x 2 PV
valD,s, (o.a) = s(a)(valD,s, (o)), a 2 Attr
valD,s, ( f (t1, . . . , tn)) = D( f )(valD,s, (t1), . . . , valD,s, (tn))
valD,s, ( ? t1 : t2) =
⇢
valD,s, (t1) if valD,s, ( ) = tt
valD,s, (t2) otherwise
valD,s, ({u}t) = valD,s0, (t), s0 = valD,s, (u)(s)
For formulas:
valD,s, (true) = tt
valD,s, (false) = ff
valD,s, (p(t1, . . . , tn)) = tt iff (valD,s, (t1), . . . , valD,s, (tn)) 2 D(p)
valD,s, (¬ ) = tt iff valD,s, ( ) = ff
valD,s, ( ^ ) = tt iff valD,s, ( ) = tt and valD,s, ( ) = tt
valD,s, ( _ ) = tt iff valD,s, ( ) = tt or valD,s, ( ) = tt
valD,s, ( !  ) = valD,s, (¬ _ )
valD,s, ( $  ) = valD,s, ( !   ^ ! )
valD,s, ([p] ) = tt iff ff /2 {valD,s0, ( )|s0 2 valD,s(p)}
valD,s, ({u} ) = valD,s0, ( ), where s0 = valD,s, (u)(s)
For updates:
valD,s, (x := t)(s) = s[x t]
valD,s, (o.a := t)(s) = s[(a)(valD,s, (o)) t]
valD,s, (u1ku2)(s) = valD,s, (u2)(valD,s, (u1)(s))
valD,s, ({u1}u2)(s) = valD,s0, (u2)(s0), where s0 = valD,s, (u1)(s)
For expressions:
valD,s(x) = {(s, s(x))}, x 2 PV
valD,s(o.a) = {(s0, s(a)(d)) | (s0, d) 2 valD,s(o)^ d 6= null}
valD,s(e1   e2) = {(s00,D( )(d1, d2)) | (s0, d1) 2 valD,s(e1)^ (s00, d2) 2 valD,s0(e2)}  2 {+, ,⇤, . . .}
For statements:
valD,s(x= e) = {s0[x d] | (s0, d) 2 valD,s(e)}, x 2 PV
valD,s(o.a= e) = {s00[a(do) de] | (s0, do) 2 valD,s(o)^ (s00, de) 2 valD,s0(e)}
valD,s(p1;p2) =
S
s02valD,s(p1) valD,s0(p2)
valD,s(if(e) {p} else {q}) =
8<: valD,s0, (p), (s
0,True) 2 valD,s(e)
valD,s0, (q), (s0,False) 2 valD,s(e);, otherwise
valD,s(while(e){p}) =
8<:
S
s12S1valD,s1(while(e){p}) where S1 = valD,s0(p),
if (s0,True) 2 valD,s(e){s0}, if (s0,False) 2 valD,s(e);, otherwise
Figure 2.6: Definition of SiJa-DL semantic evaluation function.
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Definition 5 (Normal form of update). An update is in normal form, denoted byU nf , if it has the
shape {u1k . . .kun}, n   0, where each ui is an elementary update and there is no conflict between
ui and uj for any i 6= j.
Example 3 (Normal form of update). For the following updates,
• {i := j+ 1} and {i := j+ 1kj := i} are in normal form.
• {i := j+ 1}{j := i} is not in normal form.
• {i := j+ 1kj := iki := i+ 1} is not in normal form, because there is a conflict between
i := j+ 1 and i := i+ 1.
The normal form of an update U = {u1} . . . {un} can be achieved by applying a sequence of
update simplification steps shown in Figure 2.7. Soundness of these rules and that they achieve
normal form are proven in [Rüm06].
{. . .kx := v1k . . .kx := v2k . . .}v † {. . .k . . .k . . .kx := v2k . . .}v
where v 2 t [ f [ 
{. . .kx := v 0k . . .}v † {. . .k . . .}v , where v 2 t [ f [ , x /2 f pv (v )
{u}{u0}v † {uk{u}u0}v , where v 2 t [ f [ 
{u}x † x , where x 2 LVar
{u} f (t1, . . . , tn)† f ({u}(t1), . . . , {u}(tn))
{u}¬ † ¬{u} 
{u}( 1   2)† {u}( 1)   {u}( 2), where   2 {^,_,!,$}
{u}(x := v )† x := {u}v
{u}(o.a := v )† o.a := {u}v
{u}(u1ku2)† {u}u1k{u}u2
{x := v }x† v
{o.a := v }o.a† v
Figure 2.7: Update simplification rules.
Finally, we give the definitions of satisfiability, model and validity of formulas.
Definition 6 (Satisfiability, model and validity). A formula  
• is satisfiable, denoted by D, s,  |=  , if there exists a first-order structure D, a state s 2 S and
a variable assignment   with valD,s, ( ) = tt.
• has a model, denoted by D, s |=  , if there exists a first-order structure D, a state s 2 S, such
that for all variable assignments   : valD,s, ( ) = tt holds.
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• is valid, denoted by |=  , if for all first-order structures D, states s 2 S and for all variable
assignments   : valD,s, ( ) = tt holds.
We also introduce two other notions which will be used later.
Definition 7 (Signature Extension). Let ⌃,⌃0 denote two signatures. ⌃0 is called a signature
extension of ⌃ if there is an embedding  (⌃) ⇢ ⌃0 that is unique up to isomorphism and enjoys
the following properties:
•  (Sort⌃) = Sort⌃0
•  (Func⌃) ✓ Func⌃0 where for any arity countably infinite additional function symbols exist
(analogously for predicates and logic variables)
•  (⇧⌃)✓ ⇧⌃0
An important property of signature extensions is the following:
Lemma 1. Let ⌃0 ◆ ⌃ denote a signature extension as described in Definition 7. If a SiJa-DL -
formula  over⌃ has a counter example, i.e., a SiJa-DL -Kripke structureK⌃, s 2 S⌃ withK , s 6|=  ,
then  (K , s) 6|=   . In words, signature extensions are counter example preserving.
Finally, we define the notion of an anonymizing update. The motivation behind anonymizing
updates is to erase knowledge about the values of the fields included in the modifier set mod of
locations that can be modified by a program. This is achieved by assigning fresh constant or
function symbols to those locations. For example, an anonymizing update for mod⌃ = {i,j} is
{i := ci ||j := c j} where ci, c j are constants freshly introduced in the extended signature ⌃0.
Definition 8 (Anonymizing Update). Let mod denote a set of terms built from location symbols
in ⌃. An anonymizing update for mod is an update Vmod over an extended signature ⌃0 assigning
each location l(t1, . . . , tn) 2mod a term f 0l (t1, . . . , tn) where f 0l 2 ⌃0\⌃.
2.4 Sequent Calculus
To analyze a SiJa-DL formula for validity, we use a Gentzen style sequent calculus. A sequent
 1, . . . , n| {z }
 
=) 1, . . . , m| {z }
 
is a pair of sets of formulas   (antecedent) and   (succedent). Its meaning is identical to the
meaning of the formula ^
 2 
 ! _
 2 
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A sequent calculus rule
rule
premisesz }| {
 1 =) 1 . . .  n =) n
 =) | {z }
conclusion
consists of one conclusion and possibly many premises. One example of a schematic sequent
calculus rule is the rule andRight:
andRight
 =)  ,    =) ,  
 =)   ^ ,  
We call   and  schema variables which match here any arbitrary formula. A rule is applied
on a sequent s by matching its conclusion against s. The instantiated premises are then added
as children of s. For example, when applying andRight to the sequent =) i   0^¬o.a .= null
we instantiate   with i   0 and  with ¬o.a .= null. Here, .= is an equality predicate symbol.
The instantiated sequents are then added as children to the sequent and the resulting partial
proof tree becomes:
=) i  0 =) ¬o.a .= null
=) i  0^¬o.a .= null
Figure 2.8 shows a selection of first-order sequent calculus rules. A proof of the validity of a
formula   in a sequent calculus is a tree where
• each node is annotated with a sequent,
• the root is labeled with =)  ,
• for each inner node n: there is a sequent rule whose conclusion matches the sequent of n
and there is a bijection between the rule’s premises and the children of n, and,
• the last rule application on each branch is the application of a close rule (axiom).
So far the considered rules were pure first-order reasoning rules. The calculus design regarding
rules for formulas with programs is discussed next. Since in most cases the partial correctness of
programs (without termination) is our main concern, we consider only the box modality variant
of these rules.
Our sequent calculus variant is designed to symbolically execute a program in a step-wise
manner. It behaves for most parts as a symbolic program interpreter. A sequent for SiJa-DL is of
the form
 =)U [p] , 
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Axioms
close
⇤
  =)   closeTrue
⇤
=) true closeFalse
⇤
false=)
Propositional Rules
andLeft
 , ,  =) 
 ,  ^ =)  orRight
 =)  , , 
 =)   _ ,   impRight
 ,  =) , 
 =)  ! ,  
andRight
 =)  ,    =) ,  
 =)   ^ ,   orLeft
 ,  =)   , =) 
 ,  _ ,  =)
First-Order Rules
allLeft
 , [x/t] =) 
 ,8x : T.  =)  exRight
 =)  [x/t], 
 =) 9x : T.   
allRight
 =)  [x/c], 
 =)8x : T. ,   exLeft
 , [x/c] =) 
 ,9x : T.  =) 
c new, freeVars( ) = ;
Figure 2.8: First-order calculus rules (excerpt).
The general form of sequent calculus rules for SiJa-DL is:
ruleName
 1 =)U1[p1] 1, 1 . . .  n =)Un[pn] n, n
 =)U [p] , 
During symbolic execution performed by the sequent rules, the antecedents   accumulate path
conditions and contain possible preconditions. The updatesU record the current symbolic value
at each point during program execution and the  ’s represent postconditions.
We explain the core concepts along a few selected rules. Starting with the assignment rule:
assignment
 =)U {x := litVar}[!] , 
 =)U [x= litVar;!] , 
where x 2 PV, and litVar is either a boolean/integer literal or a program variable, and! the rest
of the program. The assignment rule works as most program rules on the first active statement
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ignoring the rest of the program (collapsed into!). Its effect is the movement of the elementary
program assignment into an update.
The assignment rule for an elementary addition is similar and looks like
assignAddition
 =)U {x := litVar1 + litVar2}[!] , 
 =)U [x= litVar1 + litVar2;!] , 
There is a number of other assignment rules for the different program expressions. All of the
assignment rules have in common that they operate on elementary (pure) expressions. This
is necessary to reduce the number of rules and also as expressions may have side-effects that
need to be “computed” first. Our calculus works in two phases: first complex statements and
expressions are decomposed into a sequence of simpler statements, then they are moved to an
assignment or are handled by other kinds of rules (e.g., a loopInvariant rule). The decomposition
phase consist mostly of so called unfolding rules such as:
assignAdditionUnfold
 =)U [Texp1 v1 = exp1;Texp2 v2 = exp2; x= v1+ v2;!] , 
 =)U [x= exp1 + exp2;!] , 
where exp1, exp2 are arbitrary (nested) expressions of type Texp1, Texp2; and v1,v2 fresh program
variables not yet used in the proof or in !.
The conditional rule is a typical representative of a program rule to show how splits in control
flows are treated:
ifElse
 ,U b=) {U }[p;!] ,   ,U¬b=) {U }[q;!] , 
 =)U [if (b) {p} else {q} !] , 
where b is a program variable.
The calculus provides two different kinds of rules to treat loops. The first one realizes—as one
would expect from a program interpreter—a simple unwinding of the loop:
loopUnwind
 =)U [if (b) {p;while (b) {p}} !] , 
 =)U [while (b) {p} !] , 
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The major drawback of this rule is that except for cases where the loop has a fixed and known
number of iterations, the rule can be applied arbitrarily often. Instead of unwinding the loop,
one often used alternative is the loop invariant rule loopInvariant:
loopInvariant
 =)U inv,  (init)
 ,UVmod(b^ inv) =)UVmod[p]inv,  (preserves)
 ,UVmod(¬b^ inv) =)UVmod[!] ,  (use case)
 =)U [while (b) {p} !] , 
The loop invariant rule requires the user to provide a sufficiently strong formula inv capturing
the functionality of the loop. The formula needs to be valid before the loop is executed (init
branch) and must not be invalidated by any loop iteration started from a state satisfying the loop
condition (preserves branch). Finally, in the third branch the symbolic execution continues
with the remaining program after the loop.
The anonymizing update Vmod requires further explanation. We have to show that inv is pre-
served by an arbitrary iteration of the loop body as long as the loop condition is satisfied. But
in an arbitrary iteration, values of program variables may have changed and outdated the in-
formation provided by  ,  and U . In traditional loop invariant rules, this context information
is removed completely and the still valid portions have to be added to the invariant formula
inv. We use the approach described in [BHS07] and avoid to invalidate all previous knowl-
edge. For this we require the user to provide a superset of all locations mod that are potentially
changed by the loop. The anonymizing update Vmod erases all knowledge about these locations
by setting them to a fixed, but unknown value. An overapproximation of mod can be computed
automatically.
The last rule we want to introduce is about method contracts and it is a necessity to achieve
modularity in program verification. More important for this thesis is that it allows to achieve a
modular program transformation scheme. Given a method T m(T param1, . . . ,Tn paramn) and a
method contract
C(m) = (pre(param1, . . . ,paramn),post(param1, . . . ,paramn,res),mod)
The formulas pre and post are the precondition and postcondition of the method with access
to the parameters and to the result variable res (the latter only in post). The location set
mod describes the locations (fields) that may be changed by the method. When we encounter
a method invocation, the calculus first unfolds all method arguments. After that the method
contract rule is applicable:
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methodContract
 =)U {param1 := v1k . . .kparamn := vn}pre, 
 =)U {param1 := v1k . . .kparamn := vn}Vmod(post! [r= res;!] ), 
 =)U [r= m(v1, . . . ,vn); !] , 
In the first branch we have to show that the precondition of the method is satisfied. The
second branch then allows us to assume that the postcondition is valid and we can continue
to symbolically execute the remaining program. The anonymizing update Vmod erases again all
information about the locations that may have been changed by the method. About the values
of these locations, the information encoded in the postcondition is the only knowledge that is
available and on which we can rely in the remaining proof.
Figure 2.9 gives a selection of sequent calculus rules, more detail can be found in [BHS07].
Some decomposition rules are given in Figure 2.10.
Symbolic execution of a program works as follows:
1) Select an open proof goal with a [·] modality. If no [·] exists on any branch, then symbolic
execution is completed. Focus on the first active statement (possibly empty) of the program
in the modality.
2) If it is a complex statement, apply rules to decompose it into simple statements and goto
1), otherwise continue.
3) Apply the sequent calculus rule corresponding to the first active statement.
4) Simplify the resulting updates using update simplification rules given in Figure 2.7, and
apply first-order simplification to the premises. This might result in some closed branches.
It is possible to detect and eliminate infeasible paths in this way. This step is optional.
5) Goto 1).
Example 4. We look at typical proof goals that arise during symbolic execution:
1.  , i> j)U [if (i>j) {p} else {q} !] .
Applying rule ifElse and simplification eliminates the else branch and symbolic execution
continues with p !.
2.  ) {i := ck . . .}[j = i; !]  where c is a constant.
It is sound to replace the statement j= i with j= c and continue with symbolic execution.
This is known as constant propagation. Chapter 3 shows more actions for partial evaluation
that can be integrated into symbolic execution.
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emptyBox
 =)U , 
 =)U [] , 
assignment
 =)U {x := litVar}[!] , 
 =)U [x= litVar;!] , 
assignAddition
 =)U {x := litVar1 + litVar2}[!] , 
 =)U [x= litVar1 + litVar2;!] , 
writeAttribute
 ,U¬(o .= null) =)U {o.a := se}[!] , 
 =)U [o.a= se; !] , 
ifElse
 ,U b=)U [p;!] ,   ,U¬b=)U [q;!] , 
 =)U [if (b) {p} else {q} !] , 
loopUnwind
 =)U [if (exp) {p;while (exp) {p}} !] , 
 =)U [while (exp) {p} !] , 
loopInvariant
 =)U inv,  (init)
 ,UVmod(b^ inv) =)UVmod[p]inv,  (preserves)
 ,UVmod(¬b^ inv) =)UVmod[!] ,  (use case)
 =)U [while (b) {p} !] , 
methodInvocation
 ,U¬(o .= null) =) {U }[
if (o instanceof Tn) res= o.m(se)@Tn;
else if(o instanceof Tn 1) res= o.m(se)@Tn 1;
. . .
else res= o.m(se)@T1;
!] , 
 =)U [res= o.m(se); !] , 
methodContract
 =)U {param1 := v1k . . .kparamn := vn}pre, 
 =)U {param1 := v1k . . .kparamn := vn}Vmod(post! [r= res;!] ), 
 =)U [r= m(v1, . . . ,vn); !] , 
Figure 2.9: Selected sequent calculus rules.
27
For decomposition of complex expressions:
postInc
 =)U [Ty v1 = y;y= y+ 1;x= v1;!] , 
 =)U [x= y++;!] , 
assignAdditionUnfold
 =)U [Texp1 v1 = exp1;Texp2 v2 = exp2; x= v1 + v2;!] , 
 =)U [x= exp1 + exp2;!] , 
writeAttributeUnfold
 =)U [Tnse v1 = nse;v1.a= se; !] , 
 =)U [nse.a= se; !] , 
ifElseUnfold
 =)U [boolean b = nse; if (b) {p} else {q} !] , 
 =)U [if (nse) {p} else {q} !] , 
Figure 2.10: Selected sequent calculus rules for decomposition of complex expressions.
3.  ) {o1.a := v1k . . .}[o2.a = v2; !] .
After executing o2.a= v2, the alias is analyzed as follows: (i) if o2 = null is true the program
does not terminate; (ii) else, if o2 = o1 holds, the value of o1.a in the update is overriden
and the new update is {o1.a := v2k . . .ko2.a := v2}; (iii) else the new update is {o1.a :=
v1k . . .ko2.a := v2}. Neither of (i)–(iii) might be provable and symbolic execution split into
these three cases when encountering a possibly aliased object access.
The result of symbolic execution for a SiJa program p following the sequent calculus rules is a
symbolic execution tree (SET), as illustrated in Figure 2.11. Note that, here we do not show the
part that does not contain any SiJa program, e,g, the init branch obtained after applying the
loopInvariant rule.
Program
. . . ;
. . .
if (cond) {
. . . }
else {
. . . }
while (guard) {
. . . }
. . .
. . . ;
Symbolic Execution Tree (SET)
n0
cond
guard guard
n3
n4
n5
n6
bl0
bl1 then-branch bl2 else-branch
bl3 loop body bl4
bl5 loop body bl6
SE
SE
Figure 2.11: Symbolic execution tree with loop invariant applied.
Complete symbolic execution trees are finite acyclic trees whose root is labeled with   =)
[p] ,  and no leaf has a [·] modality. Without loss of generality, we can assume that each
inner node i is annotated by a sequent  i =) Ui[pi] i, i, where pi is the program to be
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executed. Every child node is generated by rule application from its parent. A branching node
represents a statement whose execution causes branching, e.g., conditional, object access, loops
etc.
Definition 9 (Sequential block). A sequential block (SB) is a maximal program fragment in an
SET that is symbolically executed without branching.
For instance, there are 7 sequential blocks bl0,. . . ,bl6 in the SET in Figure 2.11.
Definition 10 (Child, descendent and sibling sequential block). For sequential blocks bl0 and
bl1:
• bl1 is the child of bl0, if bl0 ends in a branching node n and bl1 starts with n.
• bl1 is the descendant of bl0, if there exists sequential blocks bl0,. . . ,blm,0 < m such that
bl0=bl0, bl1=blm and each bl i+1 is the child of bl i for 0  i < m. Intuitively when m = 1,
a child is also a descendant.
• bl1 is the sibling of bl0, if both bl0 and bl1 starts with the same branching node n .
In the SET in Figure 2.11, bl3 is the child of bl1, the sibling of bl4 and the descendant of bl0.
Definition 11 (Generalized sequential block). A generalized sequential block (GSB) is a sequen-
tial block together with all its descendant sequential blocks.
It is a recursive definition, so a GSB always ends with leaf nodes. In the SET in Figure 2.11,
we have GSB {bl1, bl3, bl4} and {bl2, bl5, bl6}. However, {bl0, bl1, bl2, bl5, bl6} is not a GSB
because bl1 does not end with leaf nodes. Another remark is that a program is a GSB itself,
which is {bl0, bl1, bl2, bl3, bl4, bl5, bl6} in this SET. For convenience, we refer to a GSB with the
father sequential block. For instance, GSB {bl1, bl3, bl4} is denoted as GSB(bl1).
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3 Partial Evaluation
3.1 Partial Evaluation
The ideas behind partial evaluation go back in time even further than those behind symbolic
execution: Kleene’s well-known smn theorem from 1943 states that for each m + n-ary com-
putable function f (~x , ~y) where ~x = x1, . . . , xm, ~y = y1, . . . , yn there is an m+1-ary primitive
recursive function smn such that  smn ( f ,~x) =  ~y . f (~x , ~y). Partial evaluation can be characterized as
the research problem to prove Kleene’s theorem under the following conditions:
1.  smn ( f ,~x) is supposed to run more efficiently than f for any given ~x .
2. f is a program from a non-trivial programming language, not merely a recursive function.
3. The construction of  smn ( f ,~x) is efficient, i.e., its runtime should be comparable to compila-
tion of f -programs.
In contrast to symbolic execution the result of a partial evaluator is not the value of output
variables, but another program. The known input (named ~x above) is also called static input
while the general part ~y is called dynamic input. The partial evaluator or program special-
izer is often named mix. Figure 3.1 taken from [JGS93] gives a schematic overview of partial
evaluation.
partial
evaluator
mix
static
input ~x
specialized
program p~x
specialized
program p~x
outputdynamic
input ~y
target
program p
Figure 3.1: Partial evaluation schema.
The first efforts in partial evaluation date from the mid 1960s and were targeted towards
Lisp. Due to the rise in popularity of functional and logic programming languages, the 1980s
saw a large amount of research in partial evaluation of such languages. A seminal text on partial
evaluation is the book by Jones et al. [JGS93].
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There has been relatively little research on partial evaluation of Java. JSpec [SLC03] is the
state-of-the-art program specializer for Java. It worked by cross-translation to C as an inter-
mediate language. In fact, JSpec does not support full Java but a subset without concurrency,
exception, reflection. JSpec uses an offline partial evaluation technique that depends on binding
time analysis, which in general is not as precise as online partial evaluation. Civet [SC11] is a
recent partial evaluator for Java based on hybrid partial evaluation, which performs offline-style
specialization using an online approach without static binding time analysis. The programmer
needs to explicitly identify to which parts of the programs partial evaluation should be applied.
There is one other (commercial) Java partial evaluator called JPE1, but its capabilities and
underlying theory is not documented.
The application context of partial evaluation is rather different from that of symbolic execu-
tion: in practice, partial evaluation is not only employed to boost the efficiency of individual
programs, but often used in meta-applications such as parser/compiler generation.
We illustrate the main principles of partial evaluation by a small SiJa program depicted in
Figure 3.2 on the left. The program approximates the value of variable y to a given threshold
with accuracy eps by repeatedly increasing or decreasing it as appropriate.
y = 80;
threshold = 100;
if (y > threshold) {
decrease = true;
} else {
decrease = false;
}
while (|y-threshold| > eps) {
if (decrease) {
y-1;
} else {
y+1;
}
}
y=80
threshold=100
y>threshold ?
decrease=true decrease=false
|y-threshold| > eps ?
decrease ?
y=y-1 y=y+1
••
Figure 3.2: A simple control circuit SiJa program and its control flow graph.
We can imagine to walk a partial evaluator through the control flow graph (for the example
on the right of Figure 3.2) while maintaining a table of concrete (i.e., constant) values for the
program locations. In the example, that table is empty at first. After processing the two initial
1 http://www.gradsoft.ua/products/jpe_eng.html
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assignments it contains U = {y := 80 ||threshold := 100} (using the update notation of
Section 2.3).
Whenever a new constant value becomes known, the partial evaluator attempts to propagate
it throughout the current control flow graph (CFG). For the example, this constant propagation
results in the CFG depicted in Figure 3.3 on the left. Note that the occurrences of y that are part
of the loop have not been replaced. The reason is that y might be updated in the loop so that
these latter occurrences of y cannot be considered to be static. Likewise, the value of decrease
after the first conditional is not static either. The check whether the value of a given program
location can be considered to be static with respect to a given node in the CFG is called binding
time analysis (BTA) in partial evaluation.
Partial evaluation of our example proceeds now to the guard of the first conditional. This
guard became a constant expression which can be evaluated to false. As a consequence, one can
perform dead code elimination on the left branch of the conditional. The result is depicted in
Figure 3.3 in the middle. Now the value of decrease is static and can be propagated into the
loop (note that decrease is not changed inside the loop). After further dead code elimination,
the final result of partial evaluation is the CFG on the right of Figure 3.3.
y=80
threshold=100
80>100 ?
decrease=true decrease=false
|y-100| > eps ?
decrease ?
y=y-1 y=y+1
••
y=80
threshold=100
decrease=false
|y-100| > eps ?
decrease ?
y=y-1 y=y+1
••
y=80
threshold=100
decrease=false
|y-100| > eps ?
y=y+1
••
Figure 3.3: Partial evaluation example.
Partial evaluators necessarily approximate the target programming language semantics, be-
cause they are supposed to run fast and automatic. In the presence of such programming
language features as exceptions, inheritance with complex localization rules (as in Java), and
aliasing (e.g., references, array entries) BTA becomes very complex [SLC03].
3.2 Interleaving Symbolic Execution and Partial Evaluation
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3.2.1 General Idea
Recall from Section 2.4 that a symbolic execution tree unwinds a program’s control flow graph
(CFG). As a consequence, identical code is (symbolically) executed in many branches, however,
under differing path conditions and symbolic states. Merging back different nodes is usually not
possible without approximation or abstraction [BHW09, Wei09].
threshold=100
y>100 ?
decrease=true decrease=false
|y-100|>eps ? |y-100|>eps ?
decrease ? decrease ?
y=y-1 y=y+1 y=y-1 y=y+1
|y-100|>eps? |y-100|>eps?
decrease? decrease?
y=y-1 y=y+1 y=y-1 y=y+1
|y-100|>eps? |y-100|>eps?
decrease? decrease?
y=y-1 y=y+1 y=y-1 y=y+1
Figure 3.4: Symbolic execution tree of the control circuit program.
The hope with employing partial evaluation is that it is possible to factor out common parts
of computations in different branches by evaluating them partially before symbolic execution
takes place. The naïve approach, however, to first evaluate partially and then perform symbolic
execution fails miserably. The reason is that for partial evaluation to work well the input space
dimension of a program must be significantly reducible by identifying certain input variables to
have static values.
Typical usage scenarios for symbolic execution like program verification are not of this kind.
For example, in the program shown in Figure 3.2, it is unrealistic to classify the value of y as
static. If we redo the example without the initial assignment y= 80 then partial evaluation
can only perform one trivial constant propagation. The fact that input values for variables are
not required to be static can even be considered to be one of the main advantages of symbolic
execution and is the source of its generality: it is possible to cover all finite execution paths
simultaneously and one can start execution at any given source code position without the need
for initialization code.
The central observation that makes partial evaluation work in this context is that during sym-
bolic execution static values are accumulated continuously as path conditions added to the
current symbolic execution path. This suggests to perform partial evaluation interleaved with
symbolic execution.
34
threshold=100
y>100?
decrease=true decrease=false
|y-100|>eps? |y-100|>eps?
y=y-1 y=y+1
|y-100|>eps?
y=y-1
|y-100|>eps?
y=y+1
mix mix
mix
Figure 3.5: Symbolic execution with interleaved partial evaluation.
To be specific, we reconsider the example shown in Figure 3.2, but we remove the first state-
ment assigning the static value 80 to y. As observed above, no noteworthy simplification of the
program’s CFG can be achieved by partial evaluation any longer. The structure of the CFG after
partial evaluation remains exactly the same and only the occurrences of variable threshold are
replaced by the constant value 100. If we perform symbolic execution on this program, then the
resulting execution tree spanned by two executions of the loop is shown in Figure 3.4. The first
conditional divides the execution tree in two subtrees. The left subtree deals with the case that
the value of y is too high and needs to be decreased. The right subtree with the complementary
case.
All subsequent branches result from either the loop condition (omitted in Figure 3.4) or the
conditional expression inside the loop body testing the value of decrease. As decrease is not
modified within the loop, some of these branches are infeasible. For example the branch below
the boxed occurrence of y= y+ 1 (filled in red) is infeasible, because the value of decrease
is true in that branch. Symbolic execution will not continue on these branches (at least for
simple cases like that), but abandon them as infeasible by proving that the path condition is
contradictory. Since the value of decrease is only tested inside the loop, however, the loop
must still be first unwound and the proof that the current path condition is contradictory must be
repeated. Partial evaluation can replace this potentially expensive proof search by computation
which is drastically cheaper.
In the example, specializing the remaining program in each of the two subtrees after the
first assignment to decrease eliminates the inner-loop conditional, see Figure 3.5 (the partial
evaluation steps are labeled with mix). Hence, interleaving symbolic execution and partial
evaluation promises to achieve a significant speed-up by removing redundancy from subsequent
symbolic execution.
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3.2.2 The Program Specialization Operator
We define a program specialization operator suitable for interleaving partial evaluation with
symbolic execution in SiJa-DL. A soundness condition ensures that the operator can be safely
integrated into the sequent calculus. This approach avoids to formalize the partial evaluator in
SiJa-DL which would be tedious and inefficient.
Definition 12 (Program Specialization Operator). Let ⌃ be a signature and ⌃0 an extension of ⌃
as in Definition 7 containing countably infinite additional program variables and function symbols
for any type and arity. Let   be the embedding of ⌃ in ⌃0 ( (⌃)✓ ⌃0). The program specialization
operator
#⌃0◆⌃: ProgramElement⇥Updates⌃0 ⇥ For⌃0 ! ProgramElement
takes as arguments a SiJa-statement (-expression), an update and a SiJa-DL-formula and maps these
to a SiJa-statement (-expression), where all arguments and the result are over ⌃0.
The intention behind the above definition is that p #⌃0◆⌃ (U ,') denotes a “simpler” but
semantically equivalent version of p under the assumption that both are executed in a state
coinciding with U and satisfying '. The signature extension allows the specialization operator
to introduce new temporary variables or function symbols.
A program specialization operator is sound if and only if ⌃0 is the signature extension of ⌃
and for all SiJa-DL-formulas  2 For⌃, SiJa-DL-Kripke structures K⌃0 , and states s 2 S⌃0
K⌃0 , s |= h(p) #⌃0◆⌃ (U ,')i )K⌃0 , s |=U ('! hpi ) .
In words, the specialized program p #⌃0◆⌃ (U ,') must be able to reach at least the same
post-states as the original program p when started in a state coinciding with U in which (path
condition) ' holds.
Interleaving partial evaluation and symbolic execution is achieved by introduction rules for
the specialization operator. The simplest possibility is:
introPE
 =)U [(p) # (U , true)] , 
 =)U [p] , 
where # is sound.
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3.2.3 Specific Specialization Actions
We instantiate the generic program specialization operator of Definition 12 with some possible
actions. In each case we derive soundness conditions.
Specialization Operator Propagation.
The specialization operator needs to be propagated along the program as most of the different
specialization operations work locally on single statements or expressions. During propagation
of the operator, its knowledge base, the pair (U , ), needs to be updated by additional knowl-
edge learned from executed statements or by erasing invalid knowledge about variables altered
by the previous statement. Propagation of the specialization operator as well as updating the
knowledge base is realized by the following rewrite rule
(p;q) # (U , ) † p # (U , ); q # (U 0, 0)
This rule is unsound for arbitrarily chosen U 0,  0. Soundness is ensured under a number of
restrictions:
1. Let mod denote the set of all program locations possibly changed by p. Then we re-
quire that the SiJa-DL-formula “U respectStrongModifies(p,mod)” is valid where the pred-
icate respectStrongModifies abbreviates a formula that is valid if and only if p changes
at most locations included in mod. “Strong” means that mod must contain even loca-
tions whose values are only changed temporarily. Such a formula is expressible in SiJa-DL,
see [ERSW09] for details.
2. Let Vmod be the anonymizing update for mod (Definition 8). By fixingU 0 :=UVmod we en-
sure that the program state reached by executing p is covered by at least one interpretation
and variable assignment over the extended signature.
3.  0 must be chosen in such a way that if K⌃ |= Uhpi  then there exists also an extended
SiJa-DL-Kripke structure K⌃0 over an extended signature ⌃0 such that K⌃0 |= U 0 0. This
ensures that the post condition of p is correctly represented by  0. One possible heuristic
to obtain  0 consists of symbolic execution of p and applying the resulting update to  .
This yields a formula  00 from which we obtain a candidate for  0 by “anonymizing” all
occurrences of locations in it that occur in mod.
Constant propagation.
Constant propagation is one of the most basic operations in partial evaluation and often a
prerequisite for more complex rewrite operations. Constant propagation entails that if the value
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of a variable v is known to have a constant value c within a certain program region (typically,
until the variable is potentially reassigned) then usages of v can be replaced by c. The rewrite
rule
(v )#(U ,')† c
models the replacement operation. To ensure soundness the rather obvious condition U (' !
v
.= c) has to be proved where c is a rigid constant.
Dead-Code Elimination.
Constant propagation and constant expression evaluation result often in specializations where
the guard of a conditional (or loop) becomes constant. In this case, unreachable code in the
current state and path condition can be easily located and pruned.
A typical example for a specialization operation eliminating an infeasible symbolic execution
branch is the rule
(if (b) {p} else {q}) # (U , ) † p # (U , )
which eliminates the else branch of a conditional if the guard can be proved true. The sound-
ness condition of the rule is straightforward and self-explaining: U ( ! b .= TRUE).
Another case is
(if (b) {p} else {q}) # (U , ) † q # (U , )
where the soundness condition is: U ( ! b .= FALSE).
Safe Field Access.
Partial evaluation can be used to mark expressions as safe that contain field accesses or casts
that may otherwise cause non-termination. We use the notation @(e) to mark an expression e
as safe, for example, if we can ensure that o 6= null, then we can derive the annotation @(o.a)
for any field a in the type of o. The advantage of safe annotations is that symbolic execution
can assume that safe expressions terminate normally and needs not to spawn side proofs that
ensure it. The rewrite rule for safe field accesses is
o.a # (U , ) † @(o.a) # (U , ) .
Its soundness condition is U ( ! ¬(o .= null)).
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Type Inference.
For deep type hierarchies dynamic dispatch of method invocations may cause serious perfor-
mance issues in symbolic execution, because a long cascade of method calls is created by the
method invocation rule (Section 2.4). To reduce the number of implementation candidates we
use information from preceding symbolic execution to narrow the static type of the callee as far
as possible and to (safely) cast the reference to that type. The method invocation rule can then
determine the implementation candidates more precisely:
res= o.m(a1, . . . ,an);# (U , ) †
res=@((Cl)o # (U , )).m(a1 # (U , ), . . . ,an # (U , ));
The accompanying soundness condition U (  ! 9 Cl x; (o .= x)) ensures that the type of o is
compatible with Cl in any state specified by U ,  .
3.3 Example
As an application of interleaving symbolic execution and partial evaluation, consider the ver-
ification of a GUI library. It includes standard visual elements such as Window, Icon, Menu
and Pointer. An element has different implementations for different platforms or operating
systems. Consider the following program snippet involving dynamic method dispatch:
framework.ui.Button button = radiobuttonX11;
button.paint();
The element Button is implemented in one way for Max OS X, while it is implemented in
a different way for the X Window System. The method paint() is defined in Button which
is extended by CheckBox, Component, and Dialog. Altogether, paint() is implemented in 16
different classes including ButtonX11, ButtonMPC, RadioButtonX11, MenuItemX11, etc. The
type hierarchy is shown in Figure 3.6. In the code above button is assigned an object with type
RadioButtonX11 which implements paint(). As a consequence, it should always terminate
and the SiJa-DL-formula hguiitrue should be provable where gui abbreviates the code above.
Button
CheckBox Component
DialogButtonX11 ButtonAqua ButtonMFC
RadioButtonX11 MenuItemX11 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Figure 3.6: Type hierarchy for the GUI example.
First, we employ symbolic execution alone to do the proof. During this process,
button.paint() is unfolded into 16 different cases by the method invocation rule (Section 2.4),
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each corresponding to a possible implementation of button in one of the subclasses of Button.
The proof is constructed automatically in KeY 1.6 with 161 nodes and 10 branches in the proof
tree.
In a second experiment, we interleave symbolic execution and partial evaluation to prove
the same claim. The partial evaluator propagates with the help of the TypeInference rule in
the previous section the information that the run-time type of button is RadioButtonX11 and
the only possible implementation of button.paint() is RadioButtonX11.paint(). All other
possible implementations are pruned. Only 24 nodes and 2 branches occur in the proof tree
when running KeY integrated with a partial evaluator.
3.4 Evaluation
We implemented a simple partial evaluator for SiJa and interleaved it with symbolic execution
in the KeY system as described above. We formally verified a number of Java programs with
KeY 1.6 with and without partial evaluation.
Table 3.1 shows the experimental results for a number of small Java programs. The column
“Program” shows the name of the program we prove, the column “Strategy” shows the strat-
egy we choose to perform the proof where “SE” means symbolic execution and “SE+PE” means
interleaving symbolic execution and partial evaluation; the column “#Nodes” shows the total
number of nodes in the proof; the column “#Branches” shows the total number of branches
in the proof. The results show that interleaving symbolic execution with partial evaluation
significantly speeds up the proof for complexEval, constantPropagation, dynamicDispatch,
safeAccess, and safeTypeCast which can all be considered to be amenable to partial evalua-
tion.
Program Strategy #Nodes #Branches
SE 261 15complexEval
SE+PE 158 3
SE 65 1constantPropagation
SE+PE 56 1
SE 161 10
dynamicDispatch
SE+PE 24 2
SE 113 4
methodCall
SE+PE 108 3
SE 28 4
safeAccess
SE+PE 24 3
SE 73 5
safeTypeCast
SE+PE 45 3
Table 3.1: Symbolic execution and partial evaluation for small Java programs.
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Table 3.2 shows the experimental results of verifying a larger and more realistic Java e-
banking application used in [BHS06, Ch. 10]. The column “Proof Obligation” shows which
property we prove; the remaining columns are as in Table 3.1. The results show that symbolic
Proof Obligation Strategy #Nodes #Branches
SE 949 20
ATM.insertCard (EnsuresPost)
SE+PE 805 13
SE 2648 89
ATM.insertCard (PreservesInv)
SE+PE 2501 79
SE 661 7
ATM.enterPIN (EnsuresPost)
SE+PE 654 8
SE 1524 45
ATM.enterPIN (PreservesInv)
SE+PE 1501 44
SE 260 2
ATM.confiscateCard (EnsuresPost)
SE+PE 255 2
SE 739 19
ATM.confiscateCard (PreservesInv)
SE+PE 695 19
SE 1337 35
ATM.accountBalance (EnsuresPost)
SE+PE 1271 29
SE 2233 57
ATM.accountBalance (PreservesInv)
SE+PE 2223 59
SE 16174 136
Account.checkAndWithdraw (EnsuresPost)
SE+PE 17023 135
SE 14076 89
Account.checkAndWithdraw (PreservesInv)
SE+PE 10478 78
Table 3.2: Symbolic execution and partial evaluation for an e-banking application.
execution interleaved with partial evaluation can speed up verification proofs even for larger
applications. As is to be expected, depending on the structure of the program the benefit varies.
It is noteworthy that none of the programs and proof obligations used in the present chapter
have been changed in order to make them more amenable to partial evaluation. In no case we
have to pay a significant performance penalty which seems to indicate that partial evaluation is
a generally useful technology for symbolic execution and should generally be applied.
The case study in Section 3.3 suggests that it could pay off to take partial evaluation into
account when designing programs, specifications, and proof obligations.
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4 Program Transformation
The structure of a symbolic execution tree makes it possible to synthesize a program by bottom-
up traversal. The idea is to apply the sequent calculus rules reversely and generate the program
step-by-step. This requires to extend the sequent calculus rules with means for program synthe-
sis. Obviously, the synthesized program should behave exactly as the original one, at least for
the observable locations. To this end we introduce the notion of weak bisimulation for SiJa pro-
grams and show its soundness for program transformation. Although this chapter assumes that
the target language is the same as the source, the concept can be easily generalized to pairs of
different languages, e.g., Java (SiJa) source code and bytecode, which is discussed in Chapter 6.
4.1 Weak Bisimulation Relation of Programs
Definition 13 (Location sets, observation equivalence). A location set is a set containing program
variables x and attribute expressions o.a with a 2 Attr and o being a term of the appropriate
sort. Let loc be the set of all program locations, given two states s1, s2 and a location set obs,
obs ✓ loc. A relation ⇡: loc⇥ S⇥ S is an observation equivalence if and only if for all ol 2 obs,
valD,s1, (ol) = valD,s2, (ol) holds. It is written as s1 ⇡obs s2. We call obs observable locations.
The semantics of a SiJa program p (Figure 2.6) is a state transformation. Executing p from
a start state s results in a set of end states S0, where S0 is a singleton {s0} if p terminates, or ;
otherwise. We identify a singleton with its only member, so in case of termination, valD,s(p) is
evaluated to s0 instead of {s0}.
A transition relation  !: ⇧⇥S⇥S relates two states s, s0 by a program p if and only if p starts
in state s and terminates in state s0, written s p ! s0. We have: s p ! s0, where s0 = valD,s(p). If p
does not terminate, we write s
p !.
Since a complex statement can be decomposed into a set of simple statements, which is done
during symbolic execution, we can assume that a program p consists of simple statements.
Execution of p leads to a sequence of state transitions: s
p ! s0 ⌘ s0 sSt0 ! s1 sSt1 ! . . . sStn 1 ! sn sStn !
sn+1, where s = s0, s0 = sn+1, si a program state and sSti a simple statement (0  i  n). A
program state has the same semantics as the state defined in a Kripke structure, so we use both
notations without distinction.
Some simple statements reassign values (write) to a location ol in the observable locations
that affects the evaluation of ol in the final state. We distinguish these simple statements from
those that do not affect the observable locations.
Definition 14 (Observable and internal statement/transition). Consider states s, s0, a simple
statement sSt, a transition relation  !, where s sSt ! s0, and the observable locations obs; we
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call sSt an observable statement and  ! an observable transition, if and only if there exists
ol 2 obs, and valD,s0, (ol) 6= valD,s, (ol). We write sSt !obs. Otherwise, sSt is called an internal
statement and  ! an internal transition, written  !int.
In this definition, observable/internal transitions areminimal transitions that relate two states
with a simple statement. We indicate the simple statement sSt in the notion of the observable
transition
sSt !obs, since sSt reflects the changes of the observable locations. In contrast, an
internal statement does not appear in the notion of the internal transition.
Example 5. Given the set of observable locations obs={x, y}, the simple statement “x = 1 + z;”
is observable, because x’s value is reassigned. The statement “z = x + y;” is internal, since the
evaluation of x, y are not changed, even though the value of each variable is read by z.
Remark. An observable transition is defined by observing the changes of obs in the final state after
the transition. For a program that consists of many statements, the observable locations for the
final state may differ from that for some internal state. Assume an observable transition s
sSt !obs s0
changes the evaluation of some location ol 2 obs in state s0. The set of observable locations obs1 in
state s should also contain the locations ol1 that is read by ol, because the change to ol1 can lead to
a change of ol in the final state s0.
Example 6. Consider the set of observable locations obs={x, y} and program fragment “z = x +
y; x = 1 + z;”. The statement z = x + y; becomes observable because the value of z is changed
and it will be used later in the observable statement x = 1 + z;. The observable location set obs1
should contain z after the execution of z = x + y; .
Definition 15 (Weak transition). Given a set of observable locations obs, the transition relation
=)int is the reflexive and transitive closure of  !int: s =)int s0 holds if and only if for states
s0,. . .,sn, n 0, we have s = s0, s0 = sn and s0  !int s1  !int · · ·  !int sn. In the case of n = 0,
s =)int s holds. The transition relation sSt=)obs is the composition of the relations =)int, sSt !obs and
=)int: s sSt=)obs s0 holds if and only if there are states s1 and s2 such that s =)int s1 sSt !obs s2 =)int
s0. The weak transition
‘sSt
=)obs represents either sSt=)obs, if sSt observable or =)int otherwise.
In other words, a weak transition is a sequence of minimal transitions that contains at most
one observable transition.
Definition 16 (Weak bisimulation for states). Given two programs p1,p2 and observable locations
obs, obs0, let sSt1 be a simple statement and s1, s01 two program states of p1, and sSt2 is a simple
statement and s2, s02 are two program states of p2. A relation ⇡ is a weak bisimulation for states if
and only if s1 ⇡obs s2 implies:
• if s1
÷sSt1
=)obs0 s01, then s2
÷sSt2
=)obs0 s02 and s01 ⇡obs0 s02
44
• if s2
÷sSt2
=)obs0 s02, then s1
÷sSt1
=)obs0 s01 and s02 ⇡obs0 s01
where valD,s1(sSt1)⇡obs0 valD,s2(sSt2).
Definition 17 (Weak bisimulation for programs). Let p1,p2 be two programs, obs and obs
0 are
observable locations, and ⇡ is a weak bisimulation relation for states. ⇡ is a weak bisimulation
for programs, written p1 ⇡obs p2, if for the sequence of state transitions:
s1
p1 ! s01 ⌘ s01
sSt01 ! s11
sSt11 ! . . . sStn 11 ! sn1
sStn1 ! sn+11 , with s1 = s01, s01 = sn+11 ,
s2
p2 ! s02 ⌘ s02
sSt02 ! s12
sSt12 ! . . . sStm 12 ! sm1
sStm2 ! sm+12 , with s2 = s02, s02 = sm+12 ,
we have (i) s02 ⇡obs s01; (ii) for each state si1 there exists a state s j2 such that si1 ⇡obs0 s j2 for some
obs0; (iii) for each state s j2 there exists a state si1 such that s
j
2 ⇡obs0 si1 for some obs0, where 0 i  n
and 0 j  m.
The weak bisimulation relation for programs defined above requires a weak transition that
relates two states with at most one observable transition. This definition reflects the structural
properties of a program and can be characterized as a small-step semantics [Plo04]. It directly
implies the lemma below that relates the weak bisimulation relation of programs to a big-step
semantics [Kah87].
Lemma 2. Let p,q be programs and obs the set of observable locations. It holds p ⇡obs q if and
only if for any first-order structure D and state s, valD,s(p)⇡obs valD,s(q) holds.
4.2 The Weak Bisimulation Modality and Sequent Calculus Rules
We introduce a weak bisimulation modality which allows us to relate two programs that behave
indistinguishably on the observable locations.
Definition 18 (Weak bisimulation modality—syntax). The bisimulation modality [ p «
q ]@(obs,use) is a modal operator providing compartments for programs p, q and location sets
obs and use. We extend our definition of formulas: Let   be a SiJa-DL formula and p,q two SiJa
programs and obs,use two location sets such that pv( )✓ obs where pv( ) is the set of all program
variables occurring in  , then [ p « q ]@(obs,use)  is also a SiJa-DL formula.
The intuition behind the location set usedVar(s,p,obs) defined below is to capture precisely
those locations whose value influences the final value of an observable location l 2 obs (or the
evaluation of a formula  ) after executing a program p. We approximate the set later by the set
of all program variables in a program that are used before being redefined (i.e., assigned a new
value).
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Definition 19 (Used program variable). A variable v 2 PV is called used by a program p with
respect to a location set obs, if there exists an l 2 obs such that
D, s |= 8v l .9v0.((hpil = v l)! ({v := v0}hpil 6= v l))
The set usedVar(s,p,obs) is defined as the smallest set containing all used program variables of p
with respect to obs.
The formula defining a used variable v of a program p encodes that there is an interference
with a location contained in obs. In Example 6, z is a used variable. We formalize the semantics
of the weak bisimulation modality:
Definition 20 (Weak bisimulation modality—semantics). With p,q SiJa-programs, D, s,  , and
obs, use as before, let valD,s, ([ p « q ]@(obs,use) ) = tt if and only if
1. valD,s, ([p] ) = tt
2. use◆ usedVar(s,q,obs)
3. for all s0 ⇡use s we have valD,s(p)⇡obs valD,s0(q)
Lemma 3. Let obs be the set of all locations observable by   and let p,q be programs. If p ⇡obs q
then valD,s, ([p] )$ valD,s, ([q] ) holds for all D, s,   .
Proof. Direct consequence of Definition 20 and Lemma 2.
An extended sequent for the bisimulation modality is:
 =)U [ p « q ]@(obs,use) , 
The following lemma gives an explicit meaning of used variable set use.
Lemma 4. An extended sequent  =)U [ p « q ]@(obs,use) ,  within a sequential block bl (see
Definition 9) represents a certain state s1, where P is the original program of bl, p is the original
program to be executed in bl at state s1, and p0 is the original program already been executed in
bl; while Q is the program to be generated of bl, q is the already generated program in bl, and q0
is the remaining program to be generated in bl. The location set use are the dynamic observable
locations that the following relations hold:
(i) p⇡obs q
(ii) P⇡obs Q
(iii) p0 ⇡use q0
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Proof. The structure of this sequential block bl is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
(i) p⇡obs q
It is the direct consequence of Definition 20.
(ii) P⇡obs Q
Consider the initial state s0 of this sequential block, where use = use0, p=P and q=Q in the
sequent, we have s00 ⇡use0 s0, according to Definition 20 and Lemma 2, P⇡obs Q holds.
(iii) p0 ⇡use q0
Consider the truncated sequential block bl2 starting from the current state s1 and ending
with the final state s2 According to Definition 19, if there is no program in bl2, then we have
obs= use. Now consider the truncated sequential block bl1 starting from the initial state s0 and
ending with the current state s1. We have use = use0, p=p0, q=q0 and obs = use in the sequent,
according to Definition 20 and Lemma 2, p0 ⇡use q0 holds.
s0
s1
s2
s00
s01
s02
p0
p q
q0
P Q
obs
use
use0
U
bl
bl2
bl1
Figure 4.1: Program in a sequential block.
The sequent calculus rules for the bisimulation modality are of the following form:
ruleName
 1 =)U1[ p1 « q1 ]@(obs1,use1) 1, 1
. . .
 n =)Un[ pn « qn ]@(obsn,usen) n, n
 =)U [ p « q ]@(obs,use) , 
Figure 4.2 shows some extended sequent calculus rules, where ! denotes the generated pro-
gram that is weakly bisimilar to !, and _ is a place holder for empty.
Unlike standard sequent calculus rules that are executed from root to leaves, sequent rule
application for the bisimulation modality consists of two phases:
Phase 1. Symbolic execution of source program p as usual. In addition, the observable
location sets obsi are propagated, since they contain the locations observable by pi and  i that
will be used in the second phase. Typically, obs contains the return variables of a method and
the locations used in the continuation of the program, e.g., program variables used after a loop
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emptyBox
 =)U@(obs,_) , 
 =)U [ _ « _ ]@(obs,obs) , 
assignment
 =)U {l := r}[! « ! ]@(obs,use) , ✓
 =)U [ l= r;! « l= r;! ]@(obs,use  {l}[ {r}) ,  if l 2 use
 =)U [ l= r;! « ! ]@(obs,use) ,  otherwise
◆
ifElse
 ,U b=)U [ p;! « p;! ]@(obs,usep;!) , 
 ,U¬b=)U [ q;! « q;! ]@(obs,useq;!) , 
 =)U [ if (b) {p} else {q} ! «
if (b) {p;!} else {q;!} ]@(obs,usep;! [ useq;! [ {b}) , 
(with b boolean variable)
loopUnwind
 =)U [ if (b) {p;while (b) {p}} ! «
if (b) {p;while (b) {p}} ! ]@(obs,use) , 
 =)U [ while(b) {p} ! « if (b) {p;while(b) {p}} ! ]@(obs,use) , 
loopInvariant
 =)U inv, 
 ,UVmod(b^ inv) =)UVmod
[ p « p ]@(use1 [ {b},use2)inv, 
 ,UVmod(¬b^ inv) =)UVmod[! « ! ]@(obs,use1) , 
 =)U [ while(b){p}! « while(b){p}! ]@(obs,use1 [ use2 [ {b}) , 
methodContractC=(pre,post,mod)
 =)U {prm1 := v1k . . .kprmn := vn}pre, 
 =)U {prm1 := v1k . . .kprmn := vn}Vmod
(post! {r := res}[! « ! ]@(obs,use) ), 
 =)U [ r= m(v1, . . . ,vn); ! « r= m(v1, . . . ,vn);! ]@(obs,use) , 
(Contract C is correct)
Figure 4.2: A collection of sequent calculus rules for program transformation.
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must be reflected in the observable locations of the loop body. The result of this phase is a
symbolic execution tree as illustrated in Figure 2.11.
Phase 2. We synthesize the target program q and used variable set use from qi and usei
by applying the rules in a leave-to-root manner. One starts with a leaf node and generates
the program within its sequential block first, e.g., bl3, bl4, bl5, bl6 in Figure 2.11. These
are combined by rules corresponding to statements that contain a sequential block, such as
loopInvariant (containing bl3 and bl4). One continues with the generalized sequential block
containing the compound statements, e.g., GSB(bl2), and so on, until the root is reached. Note
that the order of processing the sequential blocks matters, for instance, the program for the
sequential block bl4 must be generated before that for bl3, because the observable locations in
node n3 depend on the used variable set of bl4 according to the loopInvariant rule.
We explain some of the rules in details.
emptyBox
 =)U@(obs,_) , 
 =)U [ _ « _ ]@(obs,obs) , 
The emptyBox rule is the starting point of program transformation in each sequential block.
The location set use is set to obs, which is the direct result of Lemma 4.
assignment
 =)U {l := r}[! « ! ]@(obs,use) ,  
 =)U [ l= r;! « l= r;! ]@(obs,use  {l}[ {r}) ,  if l 2 use
 =)U [ l= r;! « ! ]@(obs,use) ,  otherwise
!
In the assignment rule, the use set contains all program variables on which a read access might
occur in the remaining program before being overwritten. In the first case, when the left side
l of the assignment is among those variables, we have to update the use set by removing the
newly assigned program variable l and adding the variable r which is read by the assignment.
The second case makes use of the knowledge that the value of l is not accessed in the remaining
program and skips the generation of the assignment.
ifElse
 ,U b=)U [ p;! « p;! ]@(obs,usep;!) , 
 ,U¬b=)U [ q;! « q;! ]@(obs,useq;!) , 
 =)U [ if (b) {p} else {q} ! «
if (b) {p;!} else {q;!} ]@(obs,usep;! [ useq;! [ {b}) , 
(with b boolean variable)
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On encountering a conditional statement, symbolic execution splits into two branches, namely
the then branch and else branch. The generation of the conditional statement will result in
a conditional. The guard is the same as used in the original program, the then branch is the
generated version of the source then branch continued with the rest of the program after the
conditional, and the else branch is analogous to the then branch.
Note that the statements following the conditional statement are symbolically executed on
both branches. This leads to duplicated code in the generated program, and, potentially to
code size duplication at each occurrence of a conditional statement. One note in advance: code
duplication can be avoided when applying a similar technique as presented later in connection
with the loop translation rule. However, it is noteworthy that the application of this rule might
have also advantages: as discussed in Chapter 3, symbolic execution and partial evaluation can
be interleaved resulting in (considerably) smaller execution traces. Interleaving symbolic execu-
tion and partial evaluation is orthogonal to the approach presented here and can be combined
easily. In several cases this can lead to different and drastically specialized and therefore smaller
versions of the remainder program ! and !. The use set is extended canonically by joining the
use sets of the different branches and the guard variable.
loopInvariant
 =)U inv, 
 ,UVmod(b^ inv) =)UVmod
[ p « p ]@(use1 [ {b},use2)inv, 
 ,UVmod(¬b^ inv) =)UVmod[! « ! ]@(obs,use1) , 
 =)U [ while(b){p}! « while(b){p}! ]@(obs,use1 [ use2 [ {b}) , 
On the logical side the loop invariant rule is as expected and has three premises. Here we are
interested in compilation of the analyzed program rather than proving its correctness. There-
fore, it is sufficient to use true as a trivial invariant or to use any automatically obtainable
invariant. In this case the first premise (init) ensuring that the loop invariant is initially valid
contributes nothing to the program compilation process and is ignored from here onward (if
true is used as invariant then it holds trivially).
Two things are of importance: the third premise (use case) executes only the program fol-
lowing the loop. Furthermore, this code fragment is not executed by any of the other branches
and, hence, we avoid unnecessary code duplication. The second observation is that variables
read by the program in the third premise may be assigned in the loop body, but not read in the
loop body. Obviously, we have to prevent that the assignment rule discards those assignments
when compiling the loop body. Therefore, in the obs for the second premise (preserves), we
must include the used variables of the use case premise and, for similar reasons, the program
variable(s) read by the loop guard. In practice this is achieved by first executing the use case
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premise of the loop invariant rule and then including the resulting use1 set in the obs of the
preserves premise. The work flow of the synthesizing loop is shown in Figure 4.3.
. . .
while(b)
body rest
5 1
3
4
2
Figure 4.3: Work flow of synthesizing loop.
Now we show the program transformation in action.
Example 7. Given observable locations obs={x}, we perform program transformation for the fol-
lowing SiJa program.
y = y + z;
if (b) {
y = z++;
x = z;
}
else {
z = 1;
x = y + z;
y = x;
x = y + 2;
}
In the first phase, we do symbolic execution using the extended sequent calculus shown in Fig-
ure 4.2. We use spi to denote the program to be generated, and usei to denote the used variable
set. To ease the presentation, we omit postcondition  , as well as unnecessary formulas   and
 . The first active statement is an assignment, so the assignment rule is applied. A conditional is
encountered. After the application of ifElse rule, the result is the symbolic execution tree shown
in Figure 4.4.
Now the symbolic execution tree splits into 2 branches. U1 denotes the update computed in
the previous steps: {y := y+ z}. We first concentrate on the then branch, where the condition
b is True. The first active statement y= z++; is a complex statement. We decompose it into
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U1b=)U1[ y= z++; . . . « sp2 ]@({x},use2) U1¬b=)U1[ z= 1; . . . « sp3 ]@({x},use3)
=) {y := y+ z}[ if(b){. . .}else{. . .} « sp1 ]@({x},use1)
=) [ y= y+ z; . . . « sp0 ]@({x},use0)
Figure 4.4: Symbolic execution tree until conditional.
3 simple statements using the postInc rule introduced in Figure 2.10. Then after a few applica-
tions of the assignment rule followed by the emptyBox rule, the symbolic execution tree in this
sequential block is shown in Figure 4.5.
U1b=)U1{t := z}{z := z+ 1}{y := t}{x := z}@({x},_)
U1b=)U1{t := z}{z := z+ 1}{y := t}{x := z}[ « sp8 ]@({x},use8)
U1b=)U1{t := z}{z := z+ 1}{y := t}[ x= z; « sp7 ]@({x},use7)
U1b=)U1{t := z}{z := z+ 1}[ y= t; . . . « sp6 ]@({x},use6)
U1b=)U1{t := z}[ z= z+ 1; y= t; . . . « sp5 ]@({x},use5)
U1b=)U1[ int t= z; z= z+ 1; y= t; . . . « sp4 ]@({x},use4)
U1b=)U1[ y= z++; . . . « sp2 ]@({x},use2)
Figure 4.5: Symbolic execution tree of then branch.
Now the source program is empty, so we can start generating a program for this sequential
block. By applying the emptyBox rule in the other direction, we get sp8 as _ (empty program)
and use8={x}. The next rule application is assignment. Because x 2 use8, the assignment
x= z; is generated and the used variable set is updated by removing x but adding z. So we
have sp7: x= z; and use7={z}. In the next step, despite another assignment rule application,
no statement is generated because y 62 use7, and sp6 and use6 are identical to sp7 and use7.
Following 3 more assignment rule applications, in the end we get sp2: z= z+ 1;x= z; and
use2={z}. So z= z+ 1;x= z; is the program synthesized in this sequential block.
So far we have done the program transformation for the then branch. Analogous to this,
we can generate the program for the else branch. After the first phase of symbolic execution,
the symbolic execution tree is built as shown in Figure 4.6. In the second phase, the program
is synthesized after applying a sequence of assignment rules. The resulting program for this
sequential block is sp3: z= 1;x= y+ z;y= x;x= y+ 2;, while use3={y}.
Now we have synthesized the program for both sequential blocks. Back to the symbolic execu-
tion tree shown in Figure 4.4, we can build a conditional by applying the ifElse rule. The result
is sp1: if(b) {z= z+ 1;x= z; } else {z= 1;x= y+ z;y= x;x= y+ 2; }, and use1={b,z,y}.
After a final assignment rule application, the program generated is shown in Figure 4.7.
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U1¬b=)U1{z := 1}{x := y+ z}{y := x}{x := y+ 2}@({x},_)
U1¬b=)U1{z := 1}{x := y+ z}{y := x}{x := y+ 2}[ « sp12 ]@({x},use12)
U1¬b=)U1{z := 1}{x := y+ z}{y := x}[ x= y+ 2; « sp11 ]@({x},use11)
U1¬b=)U1{z := 1}{x := y+ z}[ y= x; . . . « sp10 ]@({x},use10)
U1¬b=)U1{z := 1}[ x= y+ z; . . . « sp9 ]@({x},use9)
U1¬b=)U1[ z= 1; . . . « sp3 ]@({x},use3)
Figure 4.6: Symbolic execution tree of else branch.
y = y + z;
if (b) {
z = z + 1;
x = z;
}
else {
z = 1;
x = y + z;
y = x;
x = y + 2;
}
Figure 4.7: The generated program for Example 7.
Remark. Our approach to program transformation will generate a program that only consists
of simple statements. The generated program is optimized to a certain degree, because the used
variable set avoids generating unnecessary statements. In this sense, our program transforma-
tion framework can be considered as program specialization. In fact, during the symbolic exe-
cution phase, we can interleave partial evaluation actions, i.e., constant propagation, deadcode-
elimination, safe field access and type inference (Section 3.2.2). It will result in a more optimized
program.
Example 8. We specialize the program shown in Example 7. In the first phase, symbolic execution
is interleaved with simple partial evaluation actions.
In the first 2 steps of symbolic execution until conditional, no partial evaluation is involved.
The resulting symbolic execution tree is identical to that shown in Figure 4.4.
There are 2 branches in the symbolic execution tree. Symbolical execution of the then branch
is the same as in Example 7. It builds the same symbolic execution tree (Figure 4.5).
Notice that after executing the statement t= z;, we did not propagate this information to the
statement y= t; and rewrite it to y= z;. The reason being z is reassigned in the statement
z= z+ 1; before y= t;, thus z is not a “constant” and we cannot apply constant propaga-
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tion. In the program generation phase, we also get sp2: z= z+ 1;x= z; and use2={z} for this
sequential block.
The first step of symbolic execution of the else branch is the application of the assignment
rule on z= 1;. Now we can perform constant propagation and rewrite the following state-
ment x= y+ z; into x= y+ 1;. The next step is a normal application of the assignment rule
on x= y+ 1;. Now we apply the assignment rule on y= x;. Since neither x nor y is reassigned
before the statement x= y+ 2;, x is considered as a “constant” and we do another step of con-
stant propagation. The statement x= y+ 2; is rewritten into x= x+ 2;. After final application
of the assignment rule and emptyBox rule, we get the symbolic execution tree:
U1¬b=)U1{z := 1}{x := y+ 1}{y := x}{x := x+ 2}@({x},_)
U1¬b=)U1{z := 1}{x := y+ 1}{y := x}{x := x+ 2}[ « sp12 ]@({x},use12)
U1¬b=)U1{z := 1}{x := y+ 1}{y := x}[ x= x+ 2; « sp11 ]@({x},use11)
U1¬b=)U1{z := 1}{x := y+ 1}[ y= x; . . . « sp10 ]@({x},use10)
U1¬b=)U1{z := 1}[ x= y+ 1; . . . « sp9 ]@({x},use9)
U1¬b=)U1[ z= 1; . . . « sp3 ]@({x},use3)
In the second phase of program generation, after applying the emptyBox rule and 4 times
assignment rules, we get sp3: x= y+ 1;x= x+ 2; and use3={y}.
Combining both branches, we finally get the specialized version of the original, shown in
Figure 4.8.
y = y + z;
if (b) {
z = z + 1;
x = z;
}
else {
x = y + 1;
x = x + 2;
}
Figure 4.8: The generated program for Example 8.
Compared to the result shown in Figure 4.7, we generated a more optimized program by
interleaving partial evaluation actions during symbolic execution phase. Further optimization
can be made by involving updates during program generation. This will be discussed later.
4.3 Soundness
Theorem 1. The extended sequent calculus rules are sound.
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The deductive description of the presented program transformation rule system enables us to
reuse standard proof techniques applied in soundness proofs for classical logic calculi.
The basic approach is to prove soundness for each rule. The soundness of the whole method
is then a consequence of the soundness theorem for classical sequent calculi `:
Theorem 2. If all rules of the proof system ` are sound, then the proof system is sound.
The soundness proof for the classical calculus rules remains unchanged. The interesting part
is the soundness proof for the rules dealing with the weak bisimulation modality. The soundness
proof of these rules requires in particular to show, that the transformed program is equivalent to
the original one up to weak bisimulation with respect to a specified set of observable locations
obs.
We need first some lemmas which establish simple properties that are mostly direct conse-
quences of the respective definitions given in the Section 4.1.
The following lemma allows us to extend the weak bisimulation relation for two states when
we know that they coincide on the value of x.
Lemma 5. Let s1, s2 2 S be observation equivalent s1 ⇡obs s2 and x : T 2 PV. If s1(x) = s2(x) then
s1 ⇡obs[{x} s2.
Proof. Direct consequence of Definition 13.
The next lemma states that two bisimilar states remain bisimular if both are updated by iden-
tical assignments:
Lemma 6. Let s1, s2 2 S be observation equivalent s1 ⇡obs s2. If s01, s02 are such that s01 = s1[x d]
and s02 = s2[x d] for a program variable x : T and domain element d 2 D(T ) then s01 ⇡obs s02.
Proof. Direct consequence of Definition 13.
We need further that the bisimulation relation is anti-monotone with respect to the set of
observable locations.
Lemma 7. Given two programs p,q and location sets loc1, loc2 with loc1 ✓ loc2. If p ⇡loc2 q then
also p⇡loc1 q.
Proof. Direct consequence of Definition 17.
Finally, we need the fact that changes to unobserved locations have no effect on the bisimula-
tion relation between two states:
Lemma 8. Let loc denote a set of locations, l : T 2 PV and s1, s2 2 S.
If l 62 loc and s1 ⇡loc s2 then for all d 2 DT :
s1[l d]⇡loc s2
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Proof. Direct consequence of Definition 13.
We can now turn to the soundness proof for the calculus rules. We prove here exemplarily
that the assignment rule for local variables is sound. The rule is central to the approach as it
performs a state change.
Lemma 9. The rule
assignment
 =)U {l := r}[! « ! ]@(obs,use) ,  
 =)U [ l= r;! « l= r;! ]@(obs,use  {l}[ {r}) ,  if l 2 use
 =)U [ l= r;! « ! ]@(obs,use) ,  otherwise
!
(with l, r local variables)
is sound.
Proof. To check the soundness of the rule, we have to prove that if all premises of the rule are
valid then its conclusion is also valid.
We fix a first-order structure D, a state s and a variable assignment   . Further, we assume
that for all formulas   2  : valD,s, ( ) = tt and for all formulas   2  : valD,s, ( ) = ff holds.
Otherwise, the conclusion is trivially satisfied by D, s,  . Hence, we can assume that
valD,s, (U {l := r}[! « ! ]@(obs,use) ) = tt
or, equivalently,
valD,bs, ([! « ! ]@(obs,use) ) = tt (4.1)
where
sU := valD,s, (U )(s), bs := valD,sU , (l := r)(sU ) = valD,s, (UkU (l := r))(s)
holds.
Case 1 (l 2 use):
We have to show that
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valD,s, (U [ l= r;! « l= r;! ]@(obs,use0) )
= valD,sU , ([ l= r;! « l= r;! ]@(obs,use
0) )
= tt
with use0 := use  {l}[ {r} holds.
To prove that valD,sU , ([ l= r;! « l= r;! ]@(obs,use0) ) = tt we need to check the three
items of Definition 20:
Item 1 is satisfied if
valD,s, (U [l= r;!] ) = tt
holds. This is a direct consequence from the correctness of the sequent calculus presented in
Section 2.4.
Item 2 use0 ◆ usedVar(s,l= r;!,obs) expresses that use0 captures at least all used variables and
it is a direct consequence of the definition of usedVar. By assumption use contains at least all
variables actually read by !. The program l= r;! redefines l which can be safely removed
from use while variable r is read and needs to be added.
Item 3 is the last remaining item that needs to be proven, i.e., that the two programs in the
conclusion are actually weak bisimular with respect to the location set obs.
We have to show that for all s1 ⇡use0 sU :
valD,sU (l= r;!) ⇡obs valD,s1(l= r;!)
holds. Following the semantics definitions given in Figure 2.6 we get
valD,sU (l= r;!) =
S
s02valD,sU (l=r;) valD,s0(!) = valD,bs(!)
and
valD,s1(l= r;!) =
S
s012valD,s1(l=r;) valD,s01(!) = valD, bs1(!) with {bs1}= valD,s1(l= r;)
As use0 contains r and because s1 ⇡use0 sU we get
sU (r) = s1(r) (4.2)
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and, hence,
bs(l) = bs1(l) (4.3)
Applying Lemma 6 we get
bs ⇡use0 bs1
, bs ⇡use {l}[{r} bs1
)
Lemma 7 bs ⇡use {l} bs1
)
(4.3) bs ⇡use bs1
With assumption (4.1) and Definition 18, we get valD,bs(!)⇡obs valD, bs1(!) and hence
valD,sU (l= r;!) = valD,bs(!)⇡obs valD, bs1(!) = valD,s1(l= r;!)
Case 2 (l 62 use): As for case 1 we have to check all three items. The first item is identical
to case 1 and the second item is trivial as the transformed program does not change. Item 3
remains to be checked, i.e., for an arbitrary s1 with
s1 ⇡use0 sU (4.4)
we have to prove that
valD,sU (l= r;!) ⇡obs valD,s1(!)
holds (i.e., that the final states are observation equivalent), we have to use the fact that l 62 use
and that item 2 holds, i.e., that use contains at least all variables read by !.
s1 ⇡use0 sU
) s1 ⇡use sU
)
Lemma 8 s1 ⇡use bs
)
(4.1) valD,bs(!) ⇡obs valD,s1(!)
)
(4.1) valD,sU (l= r;!) = valD,bs(!) ⇡obs valD,s1(!)
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We conclude this section with a short discussion of the loop invariant rule. The interesting
aspect of the loop invariant rule is that the observable location set obs of the second premise
differs from the others. This allows us to establish a connection to the notion of a program
context as used in compositional correctness proofs.
Compositional compiler correctness proofs consider the context C( ) in which the compiled
entity p is used. A context C is a description contain the placeholder   which can be instantiated
by ’any’ program entity q.
The idea is to formalize a stable interface on which p can rely on and with which p interacts.
A compositional compiler must now be able to compile p such that a given correctness criteria
are satisfied for the compilation pcompiled with respect to C .
The observable location set obs in the presented approach is similar to the context as described
above. It specifies which effects must be preserved by the compiler (program transformer). E.g.,
when the program p to be transformed is a method body, then the observable set contains only
the location which refers to the result value of the method and implicitly, all heap locations.
If the effect on these locations produced by the transformed program is indistinguishable
from the respective effect of the original program, then the program transformer is considered
correct. In case of the loop invariant rule, the loop body is transformed independently in the
second branch. It would not be enough to just use the original context instead, we must demand
that all effects on local variables used by the code following the loop statement as well as the
loop guard variable are preserved.
4.4 Optimization
The previously introduced program transformation technique generates a program that consists
only of simple statements. With the help of the used variable set, we avoid generating unneces-
sary statements, so the program is optimized to a certain level. An optimization can be made to
interleave partial evaluation actions with symbolic execution in the first phase.
4.4.1 Sequentialized Normal Form of Updates
Updates reflect the state of program execution. In particular, the update in a sequential block
records the evaluation of the locations in that sequential block. We can involve updates in
the second phase of program generation, which leads to further optimization opportunities. As
defined in Definition 5, updates in normal form are in the form of static single assignment (SSA).
It is easy to maintain normal form of updates in a sequential block when applying the extended
sequent calculus rules of Figure 4.2. This can be used for further optimization of the generated
program.
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Take the assignment rule for example: after each forward rule application, we do an update
simplification step to maintain the normal form of the update for that sequential block; when
a statement is synthesized by applying the rule backwards, we use the update instead of the
executed assignment statement, to obtain the value of the location to be assigned; then we
generate the assignment statement with that value.
Example 9. Consider the following program:
i = j + 1;
j = i;
i = j + 1;
After executing the first two statements and update simplification, we obtain the normal form
update U nf2 = {i := j + 1kj := j + 1}. Doing the same with the third statement results in
U nf3 = {j := j+ 1ki := j+ 2}, which implies that in the final state i has value j+ 2 and j has
value j+ 1.
Let i be the only observable location, for which a program is now synthesized bottom-up, starting
with the third statement. The rules in Figure 4.2 would allow to generate the statement i= j+ 1;.
But, reading the value of location i from U nf3 as sketched above, the statement i= j+ 2; is
generated. This reflects the current value of j along the sequential block and saves an assignment.
A first attempt to formalize our ideas is the following assignment rule:
 =)U nf1 [! « ! ]@(obs,use) ,  
 =)U nf [ l= r;! « l= r1;! ]@(obs,use  {l}[ {r}) ,  if l 2 use
 =)U nf [ l= r;! « ! ]@(obs,use) ,  otherwise
!
(with U nf1 = {. . .kl := r1} being the normal form of U nf {l := r})
However, this rule is not sound. If we continue Example 9 with synthesizing the first two
assignments, we obtain j= j+ 1;i= j+ 2; by using the new rule, which is clearly incorrect,
because i has final value j+3 instead of j+2. The problem is that the values of locations in the
normal form update are independently synthesized from each other and do not reflect how one
statement is affected by the execution of previous statements in sequential execution. To ensure
correct usage of updates in program generation, we introduce the concept of a sequentialized
normal form (SNF) of an update. Intuitively, it is the update of the normal form in which every
involved assignment statement is independent of each other.
Definition 21 (Elementary update independence). An elementary update l1 := exp1 is indepen-
dent from another elementary update l2 := exp2, if l1 does not occur in exp2 and l2 does not occur
in exp1.
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Definition 22 (Sequentialized normal form update). An update is in sequentialized normal form,
denoted byU snf , if it has the shape of a sequence of two parallel updates {ua1k . . .kuam}{u1k . . .kun},
m  0,n  0.
{u1k . . .kun} is the core update, denoted by U snf c , where each ui is an elementary update of the
form li := expi, and all ui, uj (i 6= j) are independent and have no conflict.
{ua1k . . .kuam} is the auxiliary update, denoted by U snf a , where (i) each uai is of the form lk := l
(k   0); (ii) l is a program variable; (iii) lk is a fresh program variable not occurring anywhere
else in U snf a and not occurring in the location set of the core update lk /2 {li|0 i  n}; (iv) there
is no conflict between uai and u
a
j for all i 6= j.
Any normal form update whose elementary updates are independent is also an SNF update
that has only a core part.
Example 10 (SNF update). For the following updates,
• {i0 := iki1 := i}{i := i0 + 1kj := i1} is in sequentialized normal form.
• {i0 := jki1 := i}{i := i0+1kj := i1} and {i0 := i+1ki1 := i}{i := i0+1kj := i1} are
not in sequentialized normal form: i0 := j has different base variables on the left and right,
while i0 := i+ 1 has a complex term on the right, both contradicting (i).
• {i0 := iki1 := i}{i := i0 + 1kj := i} is not in sequentialized normal form, because i :=
i0 + 1 and j := i are not independent.
To compute the SNF of an update, in addition to the rules given in Figure 2.7 we need two
more rules shown in Figure 4.9.
(associativity) {u1}{u2}{u3}† {u1}({u2}{u3})
(introducing auxiliary) {u}† {x0 := x}({x := x0}{u}), where x0 /2 pv
Figure 4.9: Rules for computing SNF updates.
Lemma 10. The associativity rule and introducing auxiliary rule are sound.
Proof. We use the update simplification rules defined in Figure 2.7 to prove these two rules.
Associativity
The left hand side:
{u1}{u2}{u3}
† {u1k{u1}u2}{u3}
† {u1k{u1}u2k{u1k{u1}u2}u3}
The right hand side:
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{u1}({u2}{u3})
† {u1}{u2k{u2}u3}
† {u1k{u1}(u2k{u2}u3)}
† {u1k{u1}u2k{u1}{u2}u3}
† {u1k{u1}u2k{u1k{u1}u2}u3}
So, {u1}{u2}{u3}= {u1}({u2}{u3}). We have proved the associativity rule.
Introducing auxiliary
The right hand side:
{x0 := x}({x := x0}{u})
† {x0 := x}{x := x0}{u} (associativity)
† {x0 := xk{x0 := x}x := x0}{u}
† {x0 := xkx := x}{u}
† {x := x}{u} (since x0 /2 pv )
† {u}
So the introducing auxiliary rule is proven.
We can maintain the SNF of an update on a sequential block as follows: after executing
a program statement, apply the associativity rule and compute the core update; if the newly
added elementary update l := r is not independent from some update in the core, then apply
introducing auxiliary rule to introduce {l0 := l}, then compute the new auxiliary update and
core update.
4.4.2 Sequent Calculus Rules Involving Updates
With the help of the SNF of an update, a sound assignment rule can be given as follows:
assignment
 =)U snf1 [! « ! ]@(obs,use) ,  
 =)U snf[ l= r;! « l= r1;! ]@(obs,use  {l}[ {r}) ,  if l 2 use
 =)U snf[ l= r;! « ! ]@(obs,use) ,  otherwise
!
(where U snf1 =U snf a1 {. . .kl := r1} is the SNF ofU snf{l := r})
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Whenever the core update is empty, the following auxAssignment rule is used, which means the
auxiliary assignments are always generated in the beginning of a sequential block.
auxAssignment
 =)U snf a1 [! « ! ]@(obs,use) ,  
 =)U snf a[! « Tl l0 = l;! ]@(obs,use  {l0}[ {l}) ,  if l0 2 use
 =)U snf a[! « ! ]@(obs,use) ,  otherwise
!
(where U snf a = {u} and U snf a1 = {ukl0 := l} being the auxiliary updates)
Most of the other rules are obtained by replacing U with U snf . Some are shown in Fig-
ure 4.10.
Example 11. We demonstrate that the program from Example 9 is now handled correctly. After
executing the first two statements and simplifying the update, we get the normal form update
U nf2 = {i := j+ 1kj := j+ 1}. Here a dependency issue occurs, so we introduce the auxiliary
update {j0 := j} and simplify to the sequentialized normal form update U snf2 = {j0 := j}{i :=
j0 + 1kj := j0 + 1}. Continuing with the third statement and performing update simplification
results in the SNF update U snf3 = {j0 := j}{j := j0+1ki := j0+2}. By applying the rules above,
we synthesize the program int j0= j;i= j0+2;, which still saves one assignment and is sound.
Remark. Remember that the program is synthesized within a sequential block first and then con-
structed. The SNF updates used in the above rules are the SNF updates in the current sequential
block. A program execution path may contain several sequential blocks. We do keep the SNF update
for each sequential block without simplifying them further into a bigger SNF update for the entire
execution path. For example in Figure 2.11, the execution path from node n0 to n4 involves 3 se-
quential blocks bl0, bl1 and bl4. When we synthesize the program in bl4, more precisely, we should
write U snf0 U snf2 U snf4 to represent the update used in the rules. However, we just care about the SNF
update of bl4 when generating the program for bl4, so in the above rules, U snf refers to U snf4 and
the other SNF updates are omitted.
Theorem 3. The extended sequent calculus rules involving updates are sound.
Proof. Follows from the soundness of the extended sequent calculus rules (Theorem 1), the
update simplification rules (Figure 2.7) and Lemma 10.
Now we revisit Example 7 and show how to generate a more optimized program.
Example 12. Given observable locations obs={x}, specialize the following SiJa program by the
approach involving updates in the program generation phase.
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emptyBox
 =)U snf@(obs,_) , 
 =)U snf[ _ « _ ]@(obs,obs) , 
assignment
 =)U snf1 [! « ! ]@(obs,use) , ✓
 =)U snf[ l= r;! « l= r1;! ]@(obs,use  {l}[ {r}) ,  if l 2 use
 =)U snf[ l= r;! « ! ]@(obs,use) ,  otherwise
◆
(where U snf1 =U snf a1 {. . .kl := r1} is the SNF ofU snf{l := r})
auxAssignment
 =)U snf a1 [! « ! ]@(obs,use) , ✓
 =)U snf a[! « Tl l0 = l;! ]@(obs,use  {l0}[ {l}) ,  if l0 2 use
 =)U snf a[! « ! ]@(obs,use) ,  otherwise
◆
(where U snf a = {u} and U snf a1 = {ukl0 := l} being the auxiliary updates)
ifElse
 ,U snfb=)U snf[ p;! « p;! ]@(obs,usep;!) , 
 ,U snf¬b=)U snf[ q;! « q;! ]@(obs,useq;!) , 
 =)U snf[ if (b) {p} else {q} ! «
if (b) {p;!} else {q;!} ]@(obs,usep;! [ useq;! [ {b}) , 
(with b boolean variable)
loopUnwind
 =)U snf[ if (b) {p;while (b) {p}} ! «
if (b) {p;while (b) {p}} ! ]@(obs,use) , 
 =)U snf[ while(b) {p} ! « if (b) {p;while(b) {p}} ! ]@(obs,use) , 
loopInvariant
 =)U snf inv, 
 ,U snfVmod(b^ inv) =)U snfVmod
[ p « p ]@(use1 [ {b},use2)inv, 
 ,U snfVmod(¬b^ inv) =)U snfVmod[! « ! ]@(obs,use1) , 
 =)U snf[ while(b){p}! « while(b){p}! ]@(obs,use1 [ use2 [ {b}) , 
methodContractC=(pre,post,mod)
 =)U snf{prm1 := v1k . . .kprmn := vn}pre, 
 =)U snf{prm1 := v1k . . .kprmn := vn}Vmod
(post! {r := res}[! « ! ]@(obs,use) ), 
 =)U snf[ r= m(v1, . . . ,vn); ! « r= m(v1, . . . ,vn);! ]@(obs,use) , 
(Contract C is correct)
Figure 4.10: A collection of sequent calculus rules for program transformation using SNF update.
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y = y + z;
if (b) {
y = z++;
x = z;
}
else {
z = 1;
x = y + z;
y = x;
x = y + 2;
}
In the first phase, we do symbolic execution using the extended sequent calculus rules involv-
ing updates given in Figure 4.10. We ignore the postcondition   and unnecessary formulas  
and  . To ease the presentation, we do not mention the update simplification step all the time,
but keep in mind that updates within a sequential block are always simplified after each rule
application. Also, we just show the sequents computed after sequent calculus rule application
and update simplification, but hide the intermediate ones before simplifying the updates. As
usual, spi denotes the program to be generated, and usei denotes the used variable set.
The first active statement is an assignment, we apply the assignment rule. After the application
of the ifElse rule, the result is the symbolic execution tree shown in Figure 4.11. Here, U snf1
denotes the sequentialized normal formed update {y := y+ z}. Note that in the path condition,
now we only have b (or ¬b) instead ofU snf1 b (orU snf1 ¬b). It is the result of update simplification
after applying the ifElse rule.
b=)U snf1 [ y= z++; . . . « sp2 ]@({x},use2) ¬b=)U snf1 [ z= 1; . . . « sp3 ]@({x},use3)
=) {y := y+ z}[ if(b){. . .}else{. . .} « sp1 ]@({x},use1)
=) [ y= y+ z; . . . « sp0 ]@({x},use0)
Figure 4.11: Symbolic execution tree until conditional.
Now the symbolic execution tree splits into 2 branches.
We symbolically execute the then branch first. The complex statement y= z++; is decom-
posed into 3 simple statements using the postInc rule. After the application of the assignment
rule on t= z;, the resulting update is {t := z}. It is an SNF update that only contains the core
part. Then we apply the assignment rule on z= z+ 1;. The update we get before simplifica-
tion is {t := z}{z := z+ 1}. To simplify this update, we first transform it into parallel form
{t := zkz := z+ 1} using the rules given in Figure 2.7. Notice that z, on the left hand side
of z := z+ 1, occurs on the right hand side of t := z, so the elementary updates t := z and
z := z+ 1 are not independent. To obtain an SNF update, we use the introducing auxiliary rule
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defined in Figure 4.9. So the update is rewritten as {z0 := z}({z := z0}{t := zkz := z+ 1}),
where z0 is a fresh variable and the auxiliary update {z0 := z} is introduced. After simplifying
the core part, we finally get the SNF update {z0 := z}{t := z0kz := z0+ 1}. From now on,
after a few steps application of assignment rule followed by the emptyBox rule, the symbolic
execution tree in this sequential block is shown in Figure 4.12.
¬b=)U snf1 {z0 := z}{t := z0kz := z0+ 1ky := z0kx := z0+ 1}@({x},_)
b=)U snf1 {z0 := z}{t := z0kz := z0+ 1ky := z0kx := z0+ 1}[ « sp8 ]@({x},use8)
b=)U snf1 {z0 := z}{t := z0kz := z0+ 1ky := z0}[ x= z; « sp7 ]@({x},use7)
b=)U snf1 {z0 := z}{t := z0kz := z0+ 1}[ y= t; . . . « sp6 ]@({x},use6)
b=)U snf1 {t := z}[ z= z+ 1; y= t; . . . « sp5 ]@({x},use5)
b=)U snf1 [ int t= z; z= z+ 1; y= t; . . . « sp4 ]@({x},use4)
b=)U snf1 [ y= z++; . . . « sp2 ]@({x},use2)
Figure 4.12: Symbolic execution tree of then branch.
Now we start generating the program for this sequential block. By applying the emptyBox
rule in the other direction, we get sp8 as _ and use8={x}. In the next step, since x 2 use8,
the assignment x= z0+ 1; is generated according to the assignment rule involving SNF update.
The used variable set is updated by removing x but adding z0. So we have sp7: x= z0+ 1;
and use7={z0}. The application of 4 more assignment rules generates no more new statement.
Now the core update is empty and we can generate the auxiliary assignment according to the
auxAssignment rule. In the end, we get for this sequential branch sp2 : int z0 = z;x= z0+ 1;
and use2={z}.
Analogous to this, we can generate the program for the else branch. After the first phase of
symbolic execution while maintaining the SNF update, Figure 4.13 shows the resulting symbolic
execution tree.
¬b=)U snf1 {y0 := y}{z := 1ky := y0+ 1kx := y0+ 3}@({x},_)
¬b=)U snf1 {y0 := y}{z := 1ky := y0+ 1kx := y0+ 3}[ « sp12 ]@({x},use12)
¬b=)U snf1 {y0 := y}{z := 1kx := y0+ 1ky := y0+ 1}[ x= y+ 2; « sp11 ]@({x},use11)
¬b=)U snf1 {z := 1kx := y+ 1}[ y= x; . . . « sp10 ]@({x},use10)
¬b=)U snf1 {z := 1}[ x= y+ z; . . . « sp9 ]@({x},use9)
¬b=)U snf1 [ z= 1; . . . « sp3 ]@({x},use3)
Figure 4.13: Symbolic execution tree of else branch.
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In the second phase, the program is synthesized after applying a sequence of assignment
rules and a final auxAssignment rule. The result program for this sequential block is
int y0 = y;x= y0+ 2;, and use3={y}.
Now the programs for both sequential blocks are synthesized. We can generate the whole
program by applying the ifElse rule and assignment rule. The specialized program is shown in
Figure 4.14.
y = y + z;
if (b) {
int z0 = z;
x = z0 + 1;
}
else {
int y0 = y;
x = y0 + 3;
}
Figure 4.14: The generated program for Example 12.
Compared to the specialization results from Example 7 and 8, we get a more optimized pro-
gram by involving SNF updates during the generation phase. The specialized program intro-
duces auxiliary variables and is not necessarily containing only simple statements (although
there are only simple statements in this example). This is more like a real-world program
compared to the programs only containing simple statements.
For easier reference of these program transformation approaches, we call the normal approach
PTr; the approach interleaving partial evaluation actions PTr+PE; and the approach involving
SNF updates PTr+ SNF. Obviously, we can also interleave partial evaluation actions during
symbolic execution phase, as well as involving SNF updates during generation phase, denoted
as PTr+PE+ SNF. This will achieve the most optimization.
We show the application of the program transformation and optimization techniques intro-
duced before on some larger examples.
Example 13. Specialize the following SiJa program using PTr+PE+ SNF.
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public class OnLineShopping {
boolean cpn;
public int read() { /* read price of item */ }
public int sum(int n) {
int i = 1;
int count = n;
int tot = 0;
while(i <= count) {
int m = read();
if(i >=3 && cpn) {
tot = tot + m * 9 / 10;
i++; }
else {
tot = tot + m;
i++; }
}
return tot;
}
}
Our purpose is to specialize the sum() method which consists of non-trivial constructs such as
attributes, a conditional, loop, and method call. We ignore the postcondition   and unneces-
sary formulas   and  . To ease the presentation, we do not mention partial evaluation and the
update simplification steps all the time, but keep in mind that after each rule application the
partial evaluation actions are performed and the updates within a sequential block are always
simplified. Also, we just show the final sequents computed after sequent calculus rule applica-
tion, partial evaluation and update simplification, but hide the intermediate results. As usual,
spi denotes the program to be generated, and usei denotes the used variable set. The symbolic
execution rules used here are the rules involving SNF updates that are defined in Figure 4.10.
The return value tot is the only observable location, i.e., obs = {tot}. The first phase starts
symbolically executing method sum(). The first statements of the method declare and initialize
variables. These statements are executed similar to assignments. Altogether the assignment rule
is applied three times, we end up with
=) {i := 1kcount := nktot := 0}[ while(i<= n) . . . « sp3 ]@({tot},use3)
=) {i := 1kcount := n}[ tot= 0; while(i<= n) . . . « sp2 ]@({tot},use2)
=) {i := 1}[ count= n; . . . « sp1 ]@({tot},use1)
=) [ i= 1; . . . « sp0 ]@({tot},use0)
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We use U snf1 to denote the SNF update computed in this sequential block: U snf1 = {i :=
1kcount := nktot := 0}.
The next statement to be symbolically executed is the while loop computing the total sum.
Instead of immediately applying the loop invariant rule, we unwind the loop once using the
loopUnwind rule. Partial evaluation allows to simplify the guard i<= n and i>= 3 && cpn
of the introduced conditional to 1<= n and 1>= 3 && cpn by applying constant propagation.
Furthermore, the then branch is eliminated because the guard 1>= 3 && cpn can be evaluated
to false. The result is as follows:
=)U snf1 [ if(1<= n){int m= read();tot= m;i= 2;while . . .} « sp3 ]@({tot},use3)
=)U snf1 [ if(1<= n){. . .tot= 0+ m;i= 2;while . . .} « sp3 ]@({tot},use3)
=)U snf1 [ if(1<= n){. . .if(1>= 3 && cpn) . . . ;i= 1+ 1;while . . .} « sp3 ]@({tot},use3)
=)U snf1 [ if(i<= n){. . .if(i>= 3 && cpn) . . . ;i++;while . . .} « sp3 ]@({tot},use3)
=)U snf1 [ while(i<= n) . . . « sp3 ]@({tot},use3)
Application of the ifElse rule creates two branches. The else branch contains no program so
it is synthesized right away by applying the emptyBox rule. We symbolically execute the then
branch by applying the assignment rule three times until we reach the while loop again. We use
U snf2 to denote the SNF update for the sequential block in the then branch until the while loop.
U snf2 = {m := res1ktot := res1ki := 2}. Here, in the update we use res1 to denote the return
value of read(). We decide to unwind the loop a second time. The symbolic execution follows
then the same pattern as before until we reach the loop for a third time. Figure. 4.15(a) shows
the relevant part of the symbolic execution tree of the second loop unwinding.
Instead of unwinding the loop once more, we apply the loopInvariant rule with true as the
invariant. The rule creates three new goals. The goal for the init branch is not of importance
for the specialization itself, hence, we ignore it in the following. The anonymizing update Vmod
is also ignored.
The used variables set use of the preserves branch depends on the instantiation of the use set
in the use case branch. To resolve the dependency we continue with the latter. In this case, the
use case branch contains no program, so it is trivially synthesized by applying the emptyBox
rule which results in _ as the specialized program and the only element tot in obs becomes
the use set. Based on this, the use set of the preserves branch is the union of {tot} and
the locations used in the loop guard: {tot,i}. The program in the preserves branch is then
symbolically executed by applying suitable rules until it is empty. This process is similar to that
when executing the program in the then branch of the conditional generated by loopUnwind.
U snf3 denotes the SNF update {m := res2ktot := tot+ res2ki := 3}. U snf4 denotes the SNF
update {m := res3}. The symbolic execution tree resulting from the application of the loop
invariant rule is shown in Figure. 4.15(b).
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Figure 4.15: Specialization of the while-loop by di erent means.
70
After symbolic execution we enter the second phase of our approach in which the specialized
program is generated. Recall that when applying the loopInvariant rule, the procedure of syn-
thesizing the loop starts with the use case branch. In our example, we have already performed
this step and could already determine the instantiation of the observable location set obs of the
preserves branch.
We show how the loop body is synthesized in the preserves branch: applying the emptyBox
rule instantiates the placeholders sp12 and use12 with _ and {tot,i}. Going backwards, the
assignment rule tells us how to derive the instantiations for sp11: i= i+ 1; and use11 =
{tot,i}. The instantiations for sp10 and use10 can be derived as tot= tot+ m;i= i+ 1;
and {tot,i}. Before we can continue, the instantiations of sp9 and use9 need to be deter-
mined. Similar to the derivation of sp10 and use10, applying the assignment rule a few times, we
get sp9: tot= tot+ m ⇤ 9/10;i= i+ 1; and use9={tot,i}. We have now reached the node
where the ifElse rule was previously applied. This rule allows us to derive sp8 as
if (cpn) { tot = tot + m * 9 / 10;
i = i + 1; }
else { tot = tot + m;
i = i + 1; }
and use8 = {tot,i,cpn}.
Applying suitable rules, we end up with the specialized program sp6 as
while (i<=n) {
int m = read();
if (cpn) {
tot = tot + m * 9 / 10;
i = i + 1;
}
else {
tot = tot + m;
i = i + 1;
}
}
and the used variable set use6 = {tot,i,cpn}.
Following the symbolic execution tree backwards and applying the corresponding rules, we
finally synthesize the specialized program for sum() as shown in Figure 4.16.
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public int sum(int n) {
int i;
int tot;
tot = 0;
if (1 <= n) {
tot = read();
if (2 <= n) {
tot = tot + read();
i = 3;
while(i <= n) {
int m = read();
if (cpn) {
tot = tot + m * 9 / 10;
i = i + 1;
} else {
tot = tot + m;
i = i + 1;
}
}
}
}
return tot;
}
Figure 4.16: The result of program transformation.
4.5 Implementation and Evaluation
We have a prototype implementation of the program transformation framework introduced in
this chapter. It is named PE-KeY, which is an extension based on KeY including the following
efforts:
• An information collector along with the symbolic execution of the source Java program. It
keeps track of the observable variables and constructs the working stack that is used in the
synthesize phase.
• An integrated partial evaluator which performs some simple partial evaluation operations
such as constant propagation and dead code elimination. It is used in the symbolic execu-
tion phase.
• The extended calculus rules that are used to generate programs in the second phase. KeY’s
sequent calculus has around 1200 rules of which around 100-150 rules are used for sym-
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bolic execution of programs. Around half of them have been implemented in the current
version of PE-KeY, but a considerable effort is required to get a complete coverage.
• An update analyzer used to extract symbolic values of program variables from preceding
updates to achieve a higher degree of specialization.
The current version of PE-KeY supports basic Java features such as assignment, comparison,
conditional, loop, method call inlining, integer arithmetics. Array data structure and field ac-
cess are also supported to some extent. Multi-threading and floating point arithmetics are not
supported due to limitations of KeY.
We have tried PE-KeY with a set of example programs. Although in an early stage, the exam-
ples indicate the potential of PE-KeY once full Java is supported. For instance, the (simplified)
formula
i> j! [if(i>j) max = i; else max = j;]POST
leads to the following specialization of the conditional statement:
max= i;
because of the precondition i> j and thanks to the integrated first-order reasoning mechanism
in PE-KeY. Here, POST is an unspecified predicate which can neither be proven nor disproved.
For the same reason,
i .= 5! [i++;]POST
results in the specialized statement i= 6.
In fact, the program can be specialized according to the given specification from a general
implementation. Figure 4.17 shows a fragment of a bank account implementation. A bank
account includes the current available balance and the credit line (normally fixed) that can
be used when the balance is negative. Cash withdraw can be done by calling the withdraw
method. If the withdraw amount does not exceed the available balance, the customer will get
the cash without any extra service fee; if the available balance is less than the amount to be
withdrawn, the customer will use the credit line to cover the difference with 5 extra cost; if the
withdrawn amount could not be covered by both the available balance and the credit line, the
withdraw does not succeed. In every case, the information of the new available balance will be
printed (returned). This is a general implementation of the cash withdrawal process, but some
banks (or ATMs) only allow cash withdrawal when the balance is above 0. In this case, the
precondition of the withdraw method is restricted to withdrawAmt<= availableBal. Then,
with help of PE-KeY, the implementation of method withdraw is specialized to:
return availableBal  withdrawAmt;
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public class BankAccount {
int availableBal;
int creditLn;
BankAccount( int availableBal, int creditLn ) {
this.availableBal = availableBal;
this.creditLn = creditLn;
}
public int withdraw(int withdrawAmt) {
if (withdrawAmt <= availableBal) {
availableBal = availableBal - withdrawAmt;
return availableBal;
} else {
if(withdrawAmt - availableBal <= creditLn) {
availableBal = availableBal - withdrawAmt - 5;
return availableBal;
} else {
return availableBal;
}
}
}
...
}
Figure 4.17: Code fragment of bank account.
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We applied our prototype partial evaluator also on some examples stemming from the JSpec
test suite [SLC03]. One of them is concerned with the computation of the power of an arithmetic
expression, as shown in Figure 4.18.
class Power extends Object{
int exp;
Binary op;
int neutral;
Power(int exp, Binary op,
int neutral) {
super();
this.exp = exp;
this.op = op;
this.neutral = neutral;
}
int raise(int base) {
int res = neutral;
for (int i=0; i<exp; i++) {
res = op.eval( base, res );
}
return res;
}
}
class Binary extends Object {
Binary() { super(); }
int eval(int x, int y) {
return this.eval(x, y);
}
}
class Add extends Binary {
Add() { super(); }
int eval(int x, int y) {
return x+y;
}
}
class Mult extends Binary {
Mult() { super(); }
int eval(int x, int y) {
return x*y;
}
}
Figure 4.18: Source code of the Power example as found in the JSpec suite.
The interesting part is that the arithmetic expression is represented as an abstract syntax tree
(AST) structure. The abstract class Binary is the superclass of the two concrete binary operators
Add and Mult (the strategies). The Power class can be used to apply a Binary operator op and
a neutral value for y times to a base value x, as illustrated by the following expression:
power= new Power(y,new op(),neutral).raise(x)
The actual computation for concrete values is performed on the AST representation. To be more
precise, the task was to specialize the program
power= new Power(y,new Mult(),1).raise(x);
The ac under the assumption that the value of y is constant and equal to 16.
As input formula for PE-KeY we use:
y .= 16!
[power= new Power(y,new Mult(),1).raise(x); « spres ]@(obs,use)POST
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PE-KeY then executes the program symbolically and extracts the specialized program spres as
power= (. . . ((x ⇤ x) ⇤ x) ⇤ ...) ⇤ x; (or power= x16). The achieved result is a simple int-typed
expression without the intermediate creation of the abstract syntax tree and should provide a
significantly better performance than executing the original program.
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5 Information Flow Security
5.1 Introduction
Information flows more freely in modern society. For instance, internet can deliver your infor-
mation anywhere in the world, to any place whether you intend to or not. The preservation of
confidentiality becomes a growing concern. The confidentiality of information refers to secrets,
or privacy when it is personal information.
Since nowadays software is used in many places moving information, it is important to pre-
serve the confidentiality on the program level. Information enters a program on sources and exits
on sinks. When a program runs, if an output in a sink depends on an input in a source, then there
is an information flow from that source to that sink. If this flow of information is undesired, then
an information leak has occurred. The traditional approaches of preserving confidential data by
using access control do not apply here, because access control only checks restrictions on the
release of information, but not its propagation. Information flow control [Den82] tracks the
flow of information in programs. Since each program is written in a programming language
with rigorous semantics, we can apply language-based techniques to analyze information flow
occurring in a program, to enforce that the program satisfies a security policy of interest [SM03].
A security policy places restrictions on the permitted dependencies between sources and sinks.
To specify the allowed dependencies, the sources and sinks are labeled with (partially) ordered
confidentiality levels [Den76]. The most common example of the confidentiality level is Low
(public) and High (secret). These are considered to be part of a security lattice, ordered as
{(Low, Low), (Low, High), (High, High)}. If an output on a Low sink depends on input
from a High source, an information leak occurs.
The baseline for the security policies is the notion of non-interference [Coh77, GM82]. Non-
interference states that any two runs of a program with the same Low inputs will produce the
same Low outputs, regardless of what High inputs are. In other words, an observer can derive
the information from the High variables by using only the information from the Low variables.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the non-interference policy.
Example 14. Let l1 be a Low variable and h1,h2 be High variables in a program.
• l1 = h1;
This program violates the non-interference policy because l1 is assigned the value of h1.
• l1 = h1  h2;
The non-interference policy is violated although l1 can not learn the values of h1 or h2, but
the difference of them is leaked.
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ProgramInput Output
High
Low
High
Low
Figure 5.1: Non-interference.
In the above example, the (partial) information from the value of the High variables flows
directly to the Low variables (explicit flow). It is also possible that information flows indirectly
from High to Low variables (implicit flow), as shown in the following example:
Example 15. Let l1,l2 be Low variables and h1,h2 be High variables in a program.
• if(h1 > 0) {l1 = 1; } else {l1 = 0; }
The value of l1 leaks the information of whether h1 is greater than 0.
• l1 = 0;l2 = 0; if(h1 > h2) {l1 = 1; } else {l2 = 1; }
Partial information on the comparison of h1 and h2 is leaked by observing either l1 or l2 has
been set to 1.
In Examples 14 and 15, High variables appear in the program by assigning to Low variables
explicitly or determining the values of Low variables implicitly. However, such a use of High
variables does not necessarily entail an information leak, as shown in Example 16.
Example 16. Let l1,l2 be Low variables and h1,h2 be High variables in a program.
• l1 = h1;l1 = 1;
No information is leaked because after termination the value of l1 is set to 1 although it was
assigned to h1 in the intermediate state.
• l1 = 0;l2 = 0; if(h1 > h2) {l1 = 1; } else {l1 = 1; }
The non-interference policy is valid because the value of l1 is set to 1 no matter which value
of h1 and h2 is greater. In fact, this program is equivalent to: l1 = 0;l2 = 0;l1 = 1;.
The condition of non-interference requires Low outputs to be independent of High inputs.
Devising an enforcement mechanism for this condition which is sound and permissive is an on-
going challenge. In practice, this condition is not always necessary. Many programs actually
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intend to leak some information about the High variables. Take the bank account for exam-
ple. When a user logs in to an online banking session or an ATM machine, after a failure
attempt, the correct password must not be displayed directly to the user. However, the cor-
rectness of the password can always be derived when the system allows you to log in or not,
hence this partial information is allowed to leak. This leads to the notion of information de-
classification [SS05] that certain parts of High variables can be declassified. For example, the
variable correctPassword should not flow into a Low variable, but the result of the operation
correctPassword == providedPassword is allowed to flow, thus declassified to Low.
In information flow control, a security policy is accompanied by a permissive enforcement
mechanism, proven sound with respect to the given security policy. On running a program, if
the enforcement reports a positive result, then the soundness proof implies that the program
satisfies the policy. Several approaches to enforce the security policies rely on the semantics of
the language constructs.
One way is to use static analysis that analyzes the program before executing it. These often
take the form of a security type system [VIS96, HS06] which, by tracking the confidentiality level
of information contained in variables and program context, (over-)approximates information
flows occurring in (an over-approximation of) the control flow paths the program can take. It
is possible to guarantee the nonexistence of leaky control flow paths. One advantage of static
enforcement is that the policy is enforced before running the program. It thus avoids the runtime
overhead. Another is the ability to reason about all control flow paths. It can ensure that Low
outputs observers cannot learn about High inputs by inferring which control flow path was not
taken. Since analysis is performed before the program is run, the enforcement has no access to
runtime information. A static enforcement cannot permissively enforce programs using highly
dynamic language constructs, because a large control flow branching occurs at these control
points and the coarse approximations have to be made.
Another way to enforce security policies is using dynamic analysis, or more precisely security
monitors [Vol99, AS09] in this setting. At run time, input data is labeled with the confidential-
ity level that propagates through the channels. When the monitor detects an output of data
containing a High label on a Low sink, the monitor prevents the leak by blocking the program.
Although this blocking of the program can also leak information, an advantage of dynamic
analysis is the ability to treat highly dynamic language constructs in a permissive manner. The
dynamic enforcement has runtime overhead, and cannot guarantee the absence of leaks for the
control flow paths that are not taken.
Research of information flow control addresses many other aspects of security policies and
enforcement. The reader is referred to [SM03] for a detailed survey.
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5.2 Enforcing Information Flow Security by Program Transformation
In this section, we show how to apply our program transformation framework to enforce infor-
mation flow security for SiJa programs. We concentrate on the non-interference policy.
Recall the weak bisimulation modality [ p « q ]@(obs,use) defined in Section 4.2. In a
program specialization setting, as discussed in Chapter 4, q is the same programming language
as p, and obs are normally the return variables and the variables used in the postcondition.
Running program q is equivalent to running program p except that q is more optimized.
In fact, q can also be viewed as a dependency flow of obs. This is because the extended
sequent calculus rules for the weak bisimulation modality (involving updates or not) only allow
to generate statements that will interfere with the evaluation of the obs variables in the final
state. For instance, the assignment rule will only generate an assignment in which the assigned
location belongs to use, so this assignment has an interference with obs (see Definition 19).
This observation gives us the opportunity to apply our program transformation approaches to a
information flow security setting.
Instead of generating a meaningful program q that is equivalent to p in a real program exe-
cution by fixing obs as its return variables, we can choose obs freely and generate a dependency
flow q of obs, which may not be as meaningful as the original program p. This will not affect the
soundness of our program transformation framework, because obs is not required to be fixed as
the return variables in the related definitions and proofs. So the generated program q is also
weakly bisimilar to p with respect to an arbitrary choice of obs. We can choose obs as the
variables with confidentiality level Low. By doing this, after program transformation, we get a
dependency flow q of Low variables. If q does not contain High variables, the non-interference
policy is enforced. If High variables occur in q, there is possibly an information leak. This is
formalized in Lemma 11.
Lemma 11. Given SiJa programs p, q, a set of High variables H and a set of Low variables L such
that p⇡L q. If for all h 2 H, h /2 pv(q), then the non-interference policy for program p is enforced.
Example 17. Let l1,l2 be Low variables and h1,h2 be High variables. Consider the following SiJa
programs:
(i) l1 = h1;l1 = 1;
Fixing obs as {l1}, program transformation results in: l1 = 1;. According to Lemma 11,
non-interference is enforced.
(ii) l1 = h1  h2;
Fixing obs as {l1}, program transformation ends with the same program. Non-interference
cannot be determined by Lemma 11. By inspecting the generated program, we find an explicit
information leak.
80
(iii) l1 = 0;l2 = 0; if(h1 > h2) {l1 = 1; } else {l2 = 1; }
Fixing obs as {l1,l2}, the specialized program is: if(h1 > h2) {l1 = 1; } else {l2 = 1; }.
Non-interference cannot be determined by Lemma 11. By inspecting the generated program,
we find an implicit information leak.
(iv) l1 = 0;l2 = 0; if(h1 > h2) {l1 = 1; } else {l1 = 1; }
Fixing obs as {l1,l2}, the specialized program is: l2 = 0;if(h1 > h2) {l1 = 1; } else {l1 = 1; }.
Non-interference cannot be determined by Lemma 11. By inspecting the generated program,
non-interference is enforced.
The above example shows the application of program transformation to enforce non-
interference policy. The first example can be determined directly by Lemma 11. In the other
examples, the information leak has to be checked by other enforcement approaches on the gen-
erated program. The generated program is optimized with respect to the Low variables, so it is
easier to check. In fact, Lemma 11 gives no conclusion when some High variables occur in the
generated program.
If we can give a suitable notion of explicit flow and implicit flow, then Lemma 11 can be
strengthened. A first attempt is the following definition:
Definition 23 (Explicit and implicit flow— first attempt). Given SiJa programs p, q, a set of High
variables H and a set of Low variables L such that p⇡L q.
• If there exists h 2 H and some non-boolean expression exp of program q such that h 2 pv(exp),
then there is an explicit flow in program p.
• If there exists h 2 H and some boolean expression expB of program q such that h 2 pv(expB),
then there is an implicit flow in program p.
By this definition, we can conclude that in Example 17, the second program has an explicit
information flow leak, and the third program has an implicit information flow leak.
However, Definition 23 is not accurate enough.
Example 18. Let l be Low and h be High. Consider the non-interference policy of a SiJa program:
t = h;
h = l;
l = t;
t = l;
l = h;
h = t;
This program swaps the values of l and h twice. In the end, l is assigned its original value
and cannot learn any information of h, so the non-interference policy is enforced. However,
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fixing obs as {l}, if we do program transformation using the normal approach PTr introduced in
Section 4.2, the resulting program is: h= l;l= h;, which has an explicit information leak. So
the above definition is not valid if we generate a program using PTr approach. We redo program
transformation involving partial evaluation actions and SNF updates (PTr+PE+ SNF). This
time we end up with program: l0 = l;l= l0; that leaks no information.
In order to generate a program for the purpose of information flow security enforcement, it
is better to use the most optimized approach PTr+PE+ SNF introduced in Section 4.4. This
is because PTr+PE+ SNF takes into account the SNF update in a sequential block to gener-
ate the statements with up-to-date information without showing the intermediate assignments.
Intermediate assignments are exactly the reason why Definition 23 would fail.
Based on this observation, on the second try, we give a more precise definition of explicit and
implicit flow:
Definition 24 (Explicit and implicit flow – second attempt). Given SiJa programs p, the set of
High variables H and the set of Low variables L; program q is generated by PTr+PE+ SNF
approach, and p⇡L q.
• If there exists h 2 H and some non-boolean expression exp of program q such that h 2 pv(exp),
then there is an explicit flow in program p.
• If there exists h 2 H and some boolean expression expB of program q such that h 2 pv(expB),
then there is an implicit flow in program p.
This definition is based on PTr+PE+ SNF approach thus the update in a sequential block
helps to generate a more optimized program. However, so far we have not simplified the differ-
ent SNF updates for different sequential blocks along an execution path and made use of this for
program generation, but the non-interference policy is enforced in all execution paths as stud-
ied in the static enforcement approaches. This results in the inaccuracy of Definition 24. And
the issue is, as in Definition 23, the generated intermediate assignments, this time in different
sequential blocks.
Example 19. Let l1,l2 be Low and h be High. Consider the non-interference policy for SiJa pro-
gram:
h = l1 + l2;
if (h > 0) {
l1 = h + 1;
} else {
l2 = h + 2;
}
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Fixing obs as {l1,l2}, PTr+PE+ SNF will generate an almost identical program without
much specialization. According to Definition 24, it has both an explicit and implicit information
flow leak. However, after the real execution of this program, either l1 is set to l1+ l2+ 1,
or l2 is set to l1+ l2+ 2 depending on the comparison of l1 and l2. In either case, this
program is secure. The reason is already discussed above. To avoid this issue, one possible way
is to simplify the different SNF updates for different sequential blocks along an execution path,
which will lead to another category of sequent calculus rules. This is not a trivial extension.
So far we are focusing on the generated program to find a suitable notion of information leak.
In fact, along with program generation, we also obtain the used variable set, denoted as use0
here. When program generation is finished, according to Lemma 4 and Definition 19, use0 are
the observable locations in the initial state and each variable that belongs to use0 will interfere
with obs in the final state. In other words, in the information flow security setting, every input
variable that belongs to use0 will interfere with output Low variables. According to the definition
of non-interference, we only need to guarantee that High variables do not occur in use0. If so,
the non-interference policy can be enforced. Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Non-interference Enforcement). Given a SiJa program p, a set of High variables H
and a set of Low variables L; program q and used variable set use0 is generated, and p ⇡L q. The
non-interference policy is enforced if for all h 2 H, h /2 use0.
Proof. Direct result of Lemma 4, Def. 19 and the notion of non-interference.
We show that now Example 19 works properly. After program transformation, we achieve the
used variable set as {l1,l2}. Since no High variables are involved, the non-interference policy is
enforced. By inspecting the final used variable set use0, we can check information flow security
quickly. If no High variables occur in use0, then non-interference policy is enforced; otherwise,
we can also use other existing approaches to check the generated program, which is still better
than checking the original program.
Example 20. Let l be Low variables and h be High variables in a program. We discuss whether the
standard security policy, as stated in the introduction, holds for some example programs:
(i) h= 0;l= h;
Fixing obs as {l}, program transformation results in: use0 = {;}. According to Theorem 4,
non-interference is enforced.
(ii) l= h;l= l  h;
Fixing obs as {l}, program transformation by PTr+PE+ SNF approach results in: use0 =
{;};. According to Theorem 4, non-interference is enforced.
(iii) if(h> 0) {h= l;l= h; }
Fixing obs as {l}, program transformation by PTr+PE+ SNF approach results in: use0 =
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{h} and program: if(h> 0) {l= l; }. Non-interference cannot be determined by Theorem 4.
By inspecting the generated program, non-interference is enforced.
(iv) if(h> 0) {l= 1; } else {l= 2; } l= 0;
Fixing obs as {l}, program transformation by PTr+PE+ SNF approach results in: use0 =
{h} and program: if(h> 0) {l= 0; } else {l= 0; }. Non-interference cannot be determined
by Theorem 4. By inspecting the generated program, non-interference is enforced.
Example 20 shows that Theorem 4 is still not precise enough to classify non-interference
policies for some cases. For (iii), l is assigned to itself in the then branch. If we ignore this
self-assignment, the final result is unchanged. For (iv), we have the identical program l= 0; in
both the then and else branches. In this case, the conditional does not affect the result, so it
can be safely ignored.
To achieve a more precise result, we need some extended sequent rules tailored to information
flow analysis, as shown in Figure 5.2:
assignNotSelf
 =)U snf1 [! « ! ]@(obs,use) , ✓
 =)U snf[ l= r;! « l= r1;! ]@(obs,use  {l}[ {r}) ,  if l 2 use ^ r1 6= l
 =)U snf[ l= r;! « ! ]@(obs,use) ,  otherwise
◆
(where U snf1 =U snf a1 {. . .kl := r1} is the SNF of U snf{l := r})
ifElseUnify
 ,U snfb=)U snf[ p;! « p;! ]@(obs,usep;!) , 
 ,U snf¬b=)U snf[ q;! « q;! ]@(obs,useq;!) , 
 =)U snf[ if (b) {p} else {q};! « p;! ]@(obs,usep;!) , 
(with b boolean variable, p;! ⇡obs q;!, and usep;! = useq;!)
loopInvNoBody
 =)U snf inv, 
 ,U snfVmod(b^ inv) =)U snfVmod
[ p « p ]@(use1 [ {b},use2)inv, 
 ,U snfVmod(¬b^ inv) =)U snfVmod[! « ! ]@(obs,use1) , ✓
 =)U snf[ while(b){p}! « ! ]@(obs,use1) ,  if use1 = ;
 =)U snf[ while(b){p}! « while(b){p}! ]@(obs,use1 [ use2 [ {b}) ,  otherwise
◆
Figure 5.2: Some extended sequent calculus rules tailored to information flow analysis.
The assignNotSelf rule avoids the generation of self assignments l= l;. The ifElseUnify rule
checks whether the then branch and else branch have the same effect, if so, we do not generate
a conditional block. The loopInvNoBody rule avoids the generation of a loop body, if the used
variable set obtained in the continuation of the loop is ;. Because in this case, the loop does not
affect the values of the observable locations at all.
84
Now programs (iii) and (iv) in Example 20 can be classified properly. For (iii), according to
assignNotSelf, we do not generate any program in the then branch, then apply ifElseUnify rule
(both branches are empty), we obtain the empty program, with used variable set use = {l}.
According to Theorem 4, non-interference is enforced. For (iv), we generate the program l= 0;
and use = ;, non-interference is enforced.
Example 21. Consider the following program with loop invariant l> 0 and post condition l .= 2.
Let l be Low and h be High.
l = 1;
while (h > 0) {
l ++;
h --;
}
if (l > 0) {
l = 2;
}
After symbolic execution of the loop we have three branches. In the branch that continues after the
loop, we encounter a conditional. With the loop invariant we can infer that the guard holds, so we
only execute the then branch with l= 2;. Every open goal is closeable, so the program is proven. We
start to analyze information flow security with obs = {l}. In the first step, the statement l= 2; is
generated empty used variable set. According to loopInvNoBody, we do not generate loop body code.
Continuing with l= 1;, we obtain the program l= 2; and an empty used variable set. According
to Theorem 4, non-interference is enforced.
Remark. We can perform the program transformation without suitable loop invariants (just use
true), as discussed previously (e.g, in Section 4.2). This achieves a higher degree of automation,
which is desirable in the context of program specialization. However, proper loop invariants will
increase the precision of the information flow analysis. Without the loop invariant l> 0 in Exam-
ple 21, we have to generate the conditional as well as the loop body, and then we cannot classify
this program.
Because the program transformation process employs first-order reasoning and partial evalu-
ation in the symbolic execution phase, as well as using updates during program generation, we
achieve a more precise information flow analysis than security type systems.
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6 Deductive Compilation
6.1 Introduction
Can you trust your compiler? In general, compilers should preserve the semantical behavior of
the source program and compiled program (bytecode). Complicated symbolic transformations
are performed during compilation, especially for the case of optimizing compilers. Compilers
may be buggy, resulting in a crash at compile-time, or even introducing errors to the correct
source program. Those errors introduced by compilers are notoriously difficult to expose and
track down. Nowadays, most effort of formal verification of programs is applied to the source
code level. However, a buggy compiler may invalidate the correctness properties that have been
formally verified for source code. We also need to guarantee the correctness of bytecode. The
widely used technique used for this purpose is compiler verification, that proves the correctness
of compilers.
Compiler verification has been a research topic for more than 40 years [MP67, MW72]. Since
then, many proofs have been conducted, ranging from single-pass compilers for toy languages
to sophisticated code optimizations [Dav03]. Recently, the CompCert project [Ler06, Ler09a,
Ler09b] has been the most successful story in compiler verification. In that project, a complete
compilation tool chain has been verified from a subset of C source code to PowerPC assem-
bly language in Coq. CompCert focuses on low-level details and language features such as
memory layout, register allocation and instruction selection. As part of the Verisoft project, a
nonoptimizing compiler from C0, a subset of C, directly to DLX assembly has been verified in
Isabelle/HOL [Lei08]. Like CompCert, it focuses on low-level details and proves a weak simu-
lation theorem for sequential executions. The paper [Loc10] presents a rigorous formalization
(in the proof assistant Isabelle/HOL) of concurrent Java source and byte code together with an
executable compiler and its correctness proof.
Previous works have shown that compiler verification is an expensive task. In this chapter, we
present our approach to guarantee the correctness of bytecode. Instead of verifying a compiler,
we generate bytecode step by step using the program transformation techniques introduced in
Chapter 4. The soundness of the extended sequent calculus rules entails the correctness of the
generated program. No further verification of bytecode is needed.
6.2 Sequent Calculus for Bytecode Generation
The weak bisimulation modality [ p « q ]@(obs,use) defined in Section 4.2 is the core concept
for program transformation and information flow security. For both scenarios, q is the program
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in the same language as p. In fact, it is not necessary to restrict p and q to the same programming
language. Choosing different languages for p and q will result in other applications of program
transformation. For instance, fixing p as the Java language and q as the C language will result
in a Java-to-C translator. To ensure the soundness of this translation, the correctness of the
corresponding weak bisimulation modalities and accompanied extended sequent calculus rules
need to be proven. Here we focus on the transformation from Java source code (or SiJa to be
precise) to Java bytecode, which works as a Java (SiJa) compiler. The soundness of compilation
is entailed by the sound bisimulation modality and sequent calculus rules.
We target the version of Java bytecode that can be executed by a Java Virtual Machine
(JVM) [LY97]. The Java Virtual Machine is a conventional stack-based abstract machine. Most
instructions pop their arguments off the stack, and push back their results on the stack. A set
of registers (also called local variables) is provided. They can be accessed via a load instruction
that pushes the value of a given register on the stack, and a store instruction that stores the
top of the stack in the given register. Most Java compilers use registers to store the values of
source-level local variables and method parameters, and the stack to hold temporary results
during evaluation of expressions. Both the stack and the registers are preserved across method
calls. Control is handled by a variety of branch instructions: unconditional branch (goto), con-
ditional branches (e.g., ifeq), and multiway branches (corresponding to switch). In the JVM,
most instructions are typed. For instance, the iadd instruction (integer addition) requires that
the stack initially contains at least two elements and that these two elements are of type int; it
then pushes back a result of type int. Table 6.1 shows some commonly used instructions with
descriptions, a complete list can be found in [LY97].
Example 22. Consider the following Java bytecode:
• iload_0 istore_1
Reads the value of variable 0 and stores it to variable 1.
• iload_0 iload_1 iadd
Adds the int values of variables 0 and 1.
• iload_0 iload_1 if_icmplt lbelse
iload_0 istore_2 goto lbelse
lbelse: iload_1 istore_2
Compares the values of variable 0 and variable 1, if variable 0 is less than variable 1, then
goto label lbelse and write the value of variable 1 to variable 2; otherwise continue and set
variable 2 with the value of variable 0. This program computes the max of 2 variables.
Now we define the bisimulation modality for different programming languages. In Sec-
tion 4.1, we have defined observable equivalence, observable locations, and weak bisimulation
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Mnemonic Other bytes Description
iload 1:index load an int value from a local variable #index
iload_0 load an int value from local variable 0
istore 1:index store an int value into variable #index
istore_0 store an int value into variable 0
iconst_0 load the int value 0 onto the stack
aload 1:index load a reference onto the stack from a local variable #index
aload_0 load a reference onto the stack from local variable 0
astore 1:index store a reference into a local variable #index
astore_0 store a reference into local variable 0
bipush 1:byte push a byte onto the stack as an integer value
getfield
2: index1,
index2
get a field value of an object objectref, where the field is identified by field
reference in the constant pool index
putfield
2: indexbyte1,
indexbyte2
set field to value in an object objectref, where the field is identified by a
field reference index in constant pool
iadd add two ints
isub subtract two ints
imul multiply two ints
idiv divide two ints
iinc 2: index, const increment local variable #index by signed byte const
ifeq
2: branchbyte1,
branchbyte2
if value is 0, branch to instruction at branchoffset
ifne
2: branchbyte1,
branchbyte2
if value is not 0, branch to instruction at branchoffset
ifge
2: branchbyte1,
branchbyte2
if value is no less than 0, branch to instruction at branchoffset
ifgt
2: branchbyte1,
branchbyte2
if value is greater than 0, branch to instruction at branchoffset
ifle
2: branchbyte1,
branchbyte2
if value is no greater than 0, branch to instruction at branchoffset
iflt
2: branchbyte1,
branchbyte2
if value is less than 0, branch to instruction at branchoffset
ifnull
2: branchbyte1,
branchbyte2
if value is null, branch to instruction at branchoffset
ifnonnull
2: branchbyte1,
branchbyte2
if value is not null, branch to instruction at branchoffset
if_icmpeq
2: branchbyte1,
branchbyte2
if ints are equal, branch to instruction at branchoffset
if_icmpne
2: branchbyte1,
branchbyte2
if ints are not equal, branch to instruction at branchoffset
if_icmpge
2: branchbyte1,
branchbyte2
if value1 is no less than value2, branch to instruction at branchoffset
if_icmpgt
2: branchbyte1,
branchbyte2
if value1 is greater than value2, branch to instruction at branchoffset
if_icmple
2: branchbyte1,
branchbyte2
if value1 is no greater than value2, branch to instruction at branchoffset
if_icmplt
2: branchbyte1,
branchbyte2
if value1 is less than value2, branch to instruction at branchoffset
goto
2: branchbyte1,
branchbyte2
goes to another instruction at branchoffset (signed short constructed from
unsigned bytes branchbyte1 « 8 + branchbyte2)
return return void from method
ireturn return an integer from a method
Table 6.1: A collection of Java bytecode instructions.
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for programs (Definitions 13-17). All the definitions there are on the semantic level. The seman-
tics of Java bytecode is normally defined as an operational semantics in the form of an abstract
machine (JVM). We ignore the technical details here, but show the relation of the semantics of
a SiJa program and the semantics of Java bytecode. For the formal definition of Java bytecode
semantics, readers can refer to e.g., [LY97, FM03].
Since the JVM is a stack-based abstract machine, execution of Java bytecode is a sequence of
stack operations on the JVM. A state in Java bytecode is defined as a snapshot of the status of
the registers (variables) and the stack. We define a mapping function ⇠ that relates the universe
of SiJa source code and Java bytecode.
Definition 25 (Mapping function). For a SiJa program, St is the set of statements, S is a set of
states, PV is a set of program variables. And for Java bytecode, Inst is the set of instructions, SB
is a set of states, PV is a set of variables. A mapping function ⇠ maps:
(i) every pv 2 PV to a distinct pvB 2 PVB. ⇠(pv) = pvB.
(ii) every s 2 S to an sB 2 SB. ⇠(s) = sB.
(iii) every st 2 St to a sequence of instructions: inst1 . . .instn where for 0  i  n
insti 2 Inst and ⇠(st) = inst1 · · ·instn.
⇠ 1 is the inverse of ⇠.
Figure 6.1 shows some SiJa statements and Java bytecode related by the mapping function ⇠.
We also maintain a program counter pc (initially 0) to indicate the label of bytecode instructions,
and pci has the value of pc+ i.
SiJa statement Java bytecode
l=r
iload_⇠(r)
istore_⇠(l)
p1;p2
⇠(p1)
⇠(p2)
if(b) {p} else {q}
iload_⇠(b)
ifeq pc1
⇠(p)
goto pc2
pc1: ⇠(q)
pc2: _
while(b) {p}
pc1: iload_⇠(b)
ifeq pc2
⇠(p)
goto pc1
pc2: _
Figure 6.1:Mapping of SiJa programs to Java bytecode.
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As a property of the mapping function ⇠, the following lemma gives the relation of the se-
mantics of SiJa programs to the semantics of Java bytecode. We assume the Java bytecode is
evaluated by a evaluation function valB, logic structure DB and a state s. The actual representa-
tion of DB is not of importance.
Lemma 12. Given the evaluation function val, the first-order structure D and a state s 2 S of SiJa
program p, and the corresponding evaluation function valB and logic structure DB of Java bytecode
q. If ⇠(p) = q, then valD,s(p) = valBDB ,⇠(s)(q).
Lemma 12 shows that to evaluate the Java bytecode, we can evaluate its ⇠ 1-mapped SiJa
program. This gives us an opportunity to define the weak bisimulation modality for a SiJa
program and Java bytecode by adding a mapping function ⇠ to Definitions. 13-17 in Section 4.1.
For example, the definition of weak bisimulation for SiJa program and Java bytecode is given
below. The other definitions are analogous.
Definition 26 (Weak bisimulation for SiJa program and Java bytecode). Let p1,p2 be two SiJa
programs, q is Java bytecode, and ⇠ is a mapping function such that ⇠(p2) = q. Assume obs and
obs0 are observable locations, and ⇡ is a weak bisimulation relation for states. Then ⇡ is a weak
bisimulation for a SiJa program p1 and Java bytecode q, written p1 ⇡obs q, if for the sequence of
state transitions:
s1
p1 ! s01 ⌘ s01
sSt01 ! s11
sSt11 ! . . . sStn 11 ! sn1
sStn1 ! sn+11 , with s1 = s01, s01 = sn+11 ,
s2
p2 ! s02 ⌘ s02
sSt02 ! s12
sSt12 ! . . . sStm 12 ! sm1
sStm2 ! sm+12 , with s2 = s02, s02 = sm+12 ,
(i) s02 ⇡obs s01; (ii) for each state si1 there exists a state s j2 such that si1 ⇡obs0 s j2 for some obs0; (iii)
for each state s j2 there exists a state s
i
1 such that s
j
2 ⇡obs0 si1 for some obs0, where 0  i  n and
0 j  m.
The weak bisimulation modality for a SiJa program and Java bytecode can be defined similarly
to that for SiJa programs only (Definition 18 and 20).
Definition 27 (Weak bisimulation modality for SiJa program and Java bytecode—syntax). The
bisimulation modality [ p « q ]@(obs,use) is a modal operator providing compartments for a SiJa
program p, Java bytecode q and location sets obs and use. We extend our definition of formulas:
Let   be a SiJa-DL formula and p a SiJa program, q Java bytecode and obs,use two location
sets such that pv( ) ✓ obs where pv( ) is the set of all program variables occurring in  , then
[ p « q ]@(obs,use)  is also a SiJa-DL formula.
The used program variable set usedVar(s,p,obs) is defined similarly as in Definition 19. We
formalize the semantics of the weak bisimulation modality for a SiJa program and Java bytecode:
Definition 28 (Weak bisimulation modality for a SiJa program and Java bytecode—semantics).
With p,p1 SiJa-programs, q a Java bytecode program, D, s,  , and obs, use are as before, ⇠ is a
mapping function and ⇠(p2) = q. Let valD,s, ([ p « q ]@(obs,use) ) = tt if and only if
91
1. valD,s, ([p] ) = tt
2. use◆ usedVar(s,q,obs)
3. for all s0 ⇡use s we have valD,s(p)⇡obs valD,s0(p1) = valBDB ,⇠(s0)(q)
The sequent calculus rules for Java bytecode generation can be defined based on the weak
bisimulation modality for a SiJa program and Java bytecode. The starting point is the rules
defined in Figure 4.2 that are used in the PTr method of program transformation. In most
cases, by changing the generated SiJa program part to its ⇠-mapped Java bytecode in the rules
presented there, we obtain the rules for bytecode generation, shown in Figure 6.2. The symbol
! represents the generated Java bytecode for SiJa program ! and ⇠ is the mapping function,
and we need to update the program counter after the application of the ifElse and loopInvariant
rules to obtain a correct compilation result.
Lemma 13. The extended sequent calculus rules given in Figure 6.2 are sound.
The soundness of this lemma is entailed by Lemma 1, Definition 25 and Lemma 12.
Remark. By introducing a mapping function ⇠, we avoid to the semantics of Java bytecode directly
but relate it to the semantics of SiJa programs, which results in a better integration of the new
weak bisimulation modality with the ones introduced before. In fact, ⇠ can also be viewed as the
compilation function since it maps the source code to the bytecode. However, instead of operating
on the original source program like a normal compiler would do, ⇠ is applied on the generated
source code and the bytecode is generated based on that already specialized code. So it works as an
optimizing compiler.
6.3 Example
We demonstrate our approach of bytecode generation on an example. The method to be com-
piled is shown in Figure 6.3.
This program could possibly be used in an online store. It calculates the total amount the
customer has to pay if buying i items at an item price of 20 EUR. The total sum is stored in both
tot and atot. If the customer can provide a coupon (cpn), then a reduction of 50 EUR will be
applied. Finally, the total cost is returned as tot.
We begin with symbolic execution of our example program. The first statements are simple
variable declarations and initializations that are treated similar to assignments. The first steps
until reaching the loop are shown below:
=) {tot := 0katot := 0}[ while(i> 0) . . . « bc2 ]@({tot},use2)
=) {tot := 0}[ atot= 0; . . . « bc1 ]@({tot},use1)
=) [ tot= 0; . . . « bc0 ]@({tot},use0)
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emptyBox
 =)U@(obs,_) , 
 =)U [ _ « _ ]@(obs,obs) , 
assignment
 =)U {l := r}[! « ! ]@(obs,use) , 0BBB@  =)U [ l= r;! «
iload_⇠(r)
istore_⇠(l)
!
]@(obs,use  {l}[ {r}) ,  if l 2 use
 =)U [ l= r;! « ! ]@(obs,use) ,  otherwise
1CCCA
ifElse
 ,U b=)U [ p;! « p;! ]@(obs,usep;!) , 
 ,U¬b=)U [ q;! « q;! ]@(obs,useq;!) , 
 =)U [ if (b) {p} else {q};! «
iload_⇠(b)
ifeq pc1
p;!
goto pc2
pc1 : q;!
pc2 : _
]@(obs,usep;! [ useq;! [ {b}) , 
(after rule application: pc= pc+ 2)
loopUnwind
 =)U [ if (b) {p;while (b) {p}} ! «
if (b) {p;while (b) {p}} ! ]@(obs,use) , 
 =)U [ while(b) {p} ! « if (b) {p;while(b) {p}} ! ]@(obs,use) , 
loopInvariant
 =)U inv, 
 ,UVmod(b^ inv) =)UVmod[ p « p ]@(use1 [ {b},use2)inv, 
 ,UVmod(¬b^ inv) =)UVmod[! « ! ]@(obs,use1) , 
 =)U [ while(b){p}! «
pc1 : iload_⇠(b)
ifeq pc2
!
goto pc1
pc2 : _
]@(obs,use1 [ use2 [ {b}) , 
(after rule application: pc= pc+ 2)
Figure 6.2: A collection of sequent calculus rules for generating Java bytecode.
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int tot = 0;
int atot = 0;
int i;
boolean cpn;
while (i > 0) {
tot = tot + 20;
atot = tot;
i = i - 1;
}
if (cpn) {
tot = tot - 50;
if (tot < 0) {
tot = 0;
}
}
return tot;
Figure 6.3: Program to be compiled into bytecode.
Notice that obs is instantiated with {tot}. And as usual, we ignore the postcondition   and
unnecessary formulas   and  . We use bci to denote the bytecode to be generated, and usei to
denote the used variable set.
Applying the loop invariant rule creates two new goals (we ignore the init branch). The rule
application and the resulting goals are shown below.
U1Va(inv^ (i > 0)) =)U1Va[ tot= tot+ 20; . . . « bc4 ]@({tot}[ use3 [ {i},use4)
U1Va(inv^¬(i > 0)) =)U1Va[ if(cpn) . . . « bc3 ]@({tot},use3)
=) {tot := 0katot := 0}[ while(i> 0){tot= tot+ 20; . . .}if(cpn) . . . « bc2 ]@({tot},use2)
As the used variable set use4 in the preserves branch depends on the instantiation of the
used variable set use3 of the use case branch, we continue with the use case branch. During
symbolic execution of the use case branch, two conditional statements have to be executed
until reaching the end of the method. The resulting symbolic execution tree is shown below,
where updates U1 = {tot := 0katot := 0}, U2 = {tot := tot  50}, and path condition
 1 =U1Va(inv^¬(i > 0)).
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. . . [ « bc9 ]@({tot},use9)
 1,cpn,U1VaU2(tot< 0) =)U1VaU2{tot := 0}[ « bc10 ]@({tot},use10)
 1,cpn,U1VaU2(tot< 0) =)U1VaU2[ tot= 0; « bc8 ]@({tot},use8)
 1,cpn=)U1Va{tot := tot  50}[ if(tot< 0) . . . « bc7 ]@({tot},use7)
. . . [ « bc6 ]@({tot},use6)  1,cpn=)U1Va[ tot= tot  50; . . . « bc5 ]@({tot},use5)
U1Va(inv^¬(i > 0)) =)U1Va[ if(cpn) . . . « bc3 ]@({tot},use3)
Java bytecode is to be synthesized after symbolic execution. Starting with the application of
the emptyBox rule, bc10 and use10 are instantiated as _ and {tot}.
Going backwards we can now derive the instantiations for bc8: iconst_0 istore_1 (assum-
ing ⇠(tot) = 1 for variable tot), and use8 = {tot} according to assignment rule. The previous
rule application was executing a conditional statement. Before we can continue, we have first
to derive the instantiations for the other premise. By similar steps as before, we end up with
bc9 = _ and use9 = {tot}. Having now determined all required instantiations, we can continue
with the compilation of the conditional statement. As a result we derive for the used variable
set use7 = {tot} and bc7 :
iload_1
ifle 1
iconst_0
istore_1
1:
ireturn
Applying the remaining rules, we end up with instantiations for bc3 and use3 representing the
bytecode compilation for the remaining program following the loop and the set of variables used
in it.
Assume now that we can derive that cpn is FALSE, i.e., that the customer does not possess a
coupon. Partial evaluation allows the translation of both conditional statements to be omitted.
This results in faster symbolic execution (as shown below) and in an optimized version of the
compiled program. In this case, bc3 = _, use3 = {tot,cpn}.
 1,¬cpn=)U1Va[ « bc6 ]@({tot},use6)
U1Va(inv^¬(i > 0)) =)U1Va[ if(cpn) . . . « bc3 ]@({tot},use3)
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After synthesizing the use case branch, we turn towards the preserves branch, as the required
instantiation for use3 is now known as {tot,cpn}. The symbolic execution tree of the loop body
looks like:
U1Va(inv^ (i > 0)) =)U1Va{. . .ki := i  1}[ « bc13 ]@({tot,cpn,i},use13)
U1Va(inv^ (i > 0)) =)U1Va{. . .katot := tot}[ i= i  1; « bc12 ]@({tot,cpn,i},use12)
U1Va(inv^ (i > 0)) =)U1Va{tot := tot+ 20}[ atot= tot; . . . « bc11 ]@({tot,cpn,i},use11)
U1Va(inv^ (i > 0)) =)U1Va[ tot= tot+ 20; . . . « bc4 ]@({tot,cpn,i},use4)
Synthesis of the bytecode follows the same pattern as described for the use case branch.
The Java bytecode generated under the assumption that cpn = FALSE by our approach is in
Figure 6.4. Here, ⇠(tot) = 1 and ⇠(i) = 2 for variable tot and i.
iconst_0
istore_1
1:
iload_2
ifle 2
iload_1
bipush 20
iadd
istore_1
iinc 2, -1
goto 1
2:
iload_1
ireturn
Figure 6.4: Generated Java bytecode.
We can see that the resulting Java bytecode is sound and also more optimized than that
obtained by a normal line-by-line compiler. For instance, the bytecode for the statement
atot= tot is not generated because it will not affect the final result of the observable lo-
cations (return variable). And the bytecode for the conditional is ignored thanks to partial
evaluation.
If one is only interested in sound compilation, but not in functional verification, then the
trivial postcondition true is sufficient. As a consequence, it suffices to supply true as well for
the invariant of the loopInvariant rule and symbolic execution becomes fully automatic. The
resulting first-order proof obligations are no problem for state-of-art solvers.
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7 Conclusion
7.1 Summary
In this thesis, we are concerned with the safety and security of programs. The problems ad-
dressed here are the correctness of SiJa (a subset of Java) source code and Java bytecode, and
the information flow security of SiJa programs. A lot of research has been made on these topics,
but almost all of them study each topic independently and no approach can handle all of these
aspects. We proposed a uniform framework that integrates the effort of proving correctness
and security into one process. The core concept for this uniform approach is sound program
transformation based on symbolic execution and deduction.
Symbolic execution is used to execute a source program symbolically, so that it reveals the
information on all program execution paths which can be used further for optimization and ver-
ification. We use the state-of-the-art Java verification system KeY to perform symbolic execution
of SiJa programs. The first-order reasoning capabilities of KeY analyzes variable dependencies,
aliasing, and eliminates infeasible execution paths. The symbolic execution tree (or: proof tree)
can be reduced further by interleaving partial evaluation with symbolic execution. This speeds
up the verification process for a SiJa program, as shown in Chapter 3.
Program transformation is performed based on the symbolic execution tree, which is achieved
as a side product of SiJa source code verification using KeY, or it can be built explicitly for
the purpose of program transformation which does not require strong loop invariants, post-
conditions, etc. The sequent calculus rules used to perform symbolic execution are extended
with bisimulation modalities. An extended sequent with bisimulation modalities has the form:
  =) U [ p « q ]@(obs,use) , . It means at the current state, we get program p and q that
are bisilmilar with respect to the observable locations obs. On one hand, this extension does
not affect the normal symbolic execution, nor the verification result achieved with the normal
sequent calculus rules. On the other hand, the additional information, namely observable lo-
cations obs, used variables use and the program q generated-so-far, recorded in the extended
sequent, contributes to a sound program transformation by the step-wise inverse application
of the extended calculus rules. To be more precise, obs is the set of observable locations that
matters to the output of a program; the used variables set use tracks all the locations in the
current state that may affect the result of obs after program execution; program q accumulates
the program generated so far in a generalized sequential block, and it represents the program
obtained after the generation is done. The update U records the symbolic state resulting from
program execution along a certain path.
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The program transformation process is a bottom-up traversal of the symbolic execution tree.
Starting with the nodes where the program is empty, it first synthesizes the program in each se-
quential block, and then builds a program in a generalized sequential block by combining sibling
blocks, until the whole program is generated. Our basic approach to program transformation,
called PTr, generates a program with the granularity of simple statements. The resulting pro-
gram is optimized up to a certain point considering that some assignments that are not relevant
to the final values of obs are not generated. Soundness of this approach, which is entailed by
the soundness of the extended sequent calculus rules, has been proven. This approach can be
optimized in two directions. The first direction, called PTr+PE, is to optimize the symbolic
execution tree, by interleaving partial evaluation and symbolic execution. The second direction,
called PTr+ SNF, is to take into account the updates in the generation phase and synthesizes
a program as optimal as possible in each sequential block. Combining these two directions,
PTr+PE+ SNF, we obtain the most optimized program transformation approach studied in
this thesis. Chapter 4 discussed the above program transformation approaches in detail and
showed their soundness.
An interesting observation about the extended sequent with bisimulation modalities   =)
U [ p « q ]@(obs,use) ,  is the following: obs can be chosen freely, as its choice will not affect
the soundness of the program transformation. Then we can include information flow security
of a SiJa source program into our picture by fixing obs as Low variables. By doing so, we can
generate a program that can be viewed as the dependency flow of Low variables. Intuitively,
if no High variables are present in the generated program, then the non-interference policy is
enforced; otherwise, we need to inspect the problem further with other techniques, as the gener-
ated program is an approximation of the “real” dependency flow of Low variables. Nevertheless,
we have shown that using PTr+PE+ SNF for program transformation gives a better result
than using PTr for analyzing information flow security. Another angle for non-interference pol-
icy enforcement is to inspect the used variable set use after program transformation. Since use
contains the locations that may affect the values of obs, when the program is fully generated,
use are indeed the input locations that may affect the output Low variables. So we can achieve a
strengthened statement: the non-interference policy is enforced if High variables do not appear
in use after program transformation is finished. This result is still approximate, but it provides
another angle to tackle information flow security problems, and it is more precise than the re-
sults achieved by many existing approaches, e.g., the ones based on type systems. Chapter 5
addressed this security aspect.
In the extended sequent with bisimulation modalities   =) U [ p « q ]@(obs,use) , , the
languages of p and q are not necessarily the same. We can also generate Java bytecode q from
SiJa source code p using the extended sequent calculus rules. A mapping function from SiJa
source code to Java bytecode is introduced to integrate the bytecode smoothly into the calculus.
This generation works as a SiJa compiler, and, as a consequence of the soundness of the rules, it
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is a verified optimizing compiler. It is an alternative way to obtain correct bytecode in addition
to bytecode verification or compiler verification which are normally very difficult. This idea has
been presented in Chapter 6.
To put everything together, we can guarantee safety and security of a SiJa program in one
process. Starting with a SiJa program annotated with proper JML specifications, we can verify
the correctness of source code by using KeY. After verification, if necessary, we can optimize
the program using the program transformation techniques introduced in Chapter 4. To enforce
the non-interference policy of SiJa source code, we fix obs as Low variables and do the analysis
described in Chapter 5. Java bytecode can be generated as shown in Chapter 6, which guaran-
tees correct bytecode. The total process contains four phases: one symbolic execution phase,
and three generation phases for different purposes. In fact, if we do not need to optimize the
program, after source code verification, we can ensure the bytecode correctness and enforce the
non-interference policy of the source code within one phase. In addition to normal program
generation for bytecode, we can maintain another obsi initialized with Low variables and usei
that is updated like the actual use (but without generating any program) along the generation.
In the end, we obtain a generated Java bytecode together with two used variable sets use and
usei. Now we can also enforce the non-interference policy by inspecting usei.
The outline of this thesis work can be summarized in Figure 7.1.
 =)U [ p « q ]@(obs,use) , 
source
code
correct
source code
correct
bytecode
secure
source code
optimized
source code
program verification
(symbolic execution
+ partial evaluation)
(Ch.3)
rule based
generation
q: bytecode
(Ch.6)
rule based
generation
obs: return
(Ch.4)
rule based
generation
obs: Low
(Ch.5)
deductive
compilation
program optimization
information flow
analysis
Figure 7.1: Software correctness and security: a uniform framework.
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7.2 Future Work
Software verification, compiler verification and information flow security are active research
areas, and yet a lot of work needs to be done. In particular, to continue the work of this thesis,
we plan to investigate in the following aspects:
(i) Supporting more features of the Java language. So far we have considered SiJa, a subset
of Java without floating point and concurrency, in this thesis. Formal verification of Java
floating point and concurrency has always been a difficult, yet desirable goal. It is worth
to put more effort in this research area.
(ii) Further optimization. In our work, optimization is performed by using interleaving partial
evaluation and symbolic execution and involving updates in program generation. There
are other optimizations that can be made. For example, considering ranking function
may provide us with heuristics of treating a loop. We plan to seek further optimization
opportunities.
(iii) Enforcing more security policies. This thesis has presented an approach to enforce non-
interference policy for SiJa source code. Other security policies such as information de-
classification [SS05], information integrity [BRS10] and erasure [CM05] may also be
interesting. We plan to address other security policies within our framework in the fu-
ture.
(iv) Consolidate the implementation on Java bytecode. The implementation of the program
transformation approaches presented in this thesis is still in a prototypical phase. It can be
consolidated further, especially on the implementation of deductive compilation to gener-
ate Java bytecode.
(v) Application of our framework to other scenarios. The framework presented in this thesis
can be generally applied. For example, we can generate some intermediate languages that
can be used for other specific purposes. The soundness of the corresponding extended
sequent calculus rules entails the soundness of the program generation process.
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